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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: DEFENSIVE SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

Study on defensive security concepts and policies

Report of the Secretary-General

1. By resolution 45/58 O of 4 December 1990, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and taking into account the views of Member States and other relevant information, to undertake a study of defensive security concepts and policies to be submitted to the Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

2. Pursuant to the request contained in the resolution, the Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the study on defensive security concepts and policies.

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* A/47/150.

ANNEX

Study on defensive security concepts and policies

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GLOSSARY

Full names of agreements mentioned in the text

Biological Weapons Convention	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
CFE Treaty	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Contadora Act	Contadora Act on Peace and Cooperation in Central America
Geneva Protocol	Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
Stockholm Document	Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF Treaty)	Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles
Vienna Document 1990	Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Vienna Document 1992	Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

By resolution 45/58 O of 4 December 1990 the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and taking into account the views of Member States and other relevant information, to undertake a study of defensive security concepts and policies to be submitted to the Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

The Group of Qualified Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study of Defensive Security Concepts and Policies appointed by the Secretary-General unanimously approved its report at its final meeting on 17 July 1992.

The report begins by describing the background against which the proposal for the study emerged - the welcome developments brought about by the end of the cold war but also the emergence of new threats and the reappearance of long-standing problems. These opportunities and challenges, it is argued, provide a unique opening for the international community to search for adequate and effective common approaches to cope with the military dimension of security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. To this end, a definition of defensive security is offered as a working tool.

The study proceeds to examine current trends in the international security environment and how they may influence the peaceful settlement of disputes and the effecting of restraint and a defensive orientation in the development, maintenance and use of armed forces. In this connection, it notes that the changed international environment has provided the United Nations and regional organizations and forums with an enhanced role in the resolution of conflicts.

A discussion of the substance and main features of defensive security concepts and policies follows. Existing studies and models designed to eliminate the offensive character of military force postures by effecting a defensive orientation of capabilities are surveyed. In addition, the study discusses political and military aspects of defensive security, pointing out how defensive security differs from those existing models.

An analysis is also provided of political and military-technological aspects that may hinder the implementation of a defensive orientation in military capabilities. Issues addressed in this connection include the difficulty, if not impossibility, of distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapon systems; the dilemma of maintaining effective counter-offensive capabilities while at the same time not projecting an offensive posture; the implications of collective defence and joint commitment of States for defensive security; and the applicability of defensive security at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

To address those difficulties, strategies and measures that might facilitate the transition from an offensive to a defensive orientation in

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military postures are discussed. These include the effective implementation of the system of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, as well as regional and other cooperative arrangements consistent with the Charter; confidence- and security-building measures; arms limitation and disarmament measures; and verification of compliance. The study concludes by recommending, for consideration by Member States, undertakings that might help to create a condition in which defensive security prevails.

The Secretary-General wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the Group of Experts for preparing the present report, which is hereby submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

17 July 1992

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Governmental Experts to Undertake a Study of Defensive Security Concepts and Policies, which was appointed by you in accordance with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 45/58 O of 4 December 1990.

The Governmental Experts appointed by you were the following:

Mr. Alberto E. Dojas
Counsellor
Directorate for International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship
Buenos Aires, Argentina

Mr. Mohamed Nabil Fahmy
Counsellor
Political Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cairo, Egypt

Dr. Wilhelm Nikolai Germann
Colonel (GS)
German Military Representation to NATO
Brussels, Belgium

Ambassador Boris Petrovich Krasulin
First Deputy Director
Department for International Organizations
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, Russian Federation

Ambassador François de La Gorce
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Paris, France

His Excellency
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the
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Mr. Johannes C. Landman
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Warsaw, Poland

Rear Admiral Suleiman Sa'idu
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Ambassador Farhad Shahabi Sirjani
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Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma
Joint Secretary (South)
Ministry of External Affairs
New Delhi, India

Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations
New York

The report was prepared between May 1991 and July 1992, during which period the Group held three sessions in New York, the first from 20 to 23 May 1991, the second from 13 to 24 January 1992 and the third from 6 to 17 July 1992.

The Group wishes to thank former Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, for obtaining the necessary extrabudgetary resources to convene, in connection with its second session, a seminar on defensive security to which specialists from around the world were invited. The seminar was held from 9 to 11 January 1992 and included plenary sessions to introduce various topics and working groups to allow for more in-depth discussion of those topics. The Group of Experts welcomed the opportunity offered by the seminar, as Members were able to address a number of relevant issues in an informal setting and to benefit from the various backgrounds and points of view of those participating.

In carrying out its work, the Group had before it views on the subject of defensive security concepts and policies provided by a number of Member States in response to a note verbale sent by the Secretary-General on 28 February 1991 in line with the request contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 45/58 O. Replies were received from the then Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The members of the Group of Experts wish to express their appreciation for the assistance that they received from members of the Secretariat of the United Nations. In particular, they wish to express their heartfelt thanks and appreciation to Ms. Silvana F. da Silva of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, who served as Secretary of the Group, and Mr. Ivo H. Daalder who served in his private capacity as Consultant to the Secretariat.

I have been requested by the Group of Governmental Experts, as its Chairman, to submit to you, on its behalf, this study which was unanimously approved.

(Signed) Boris P. KRASULIN
Chairman of the
Group of Governmental Experts to
Undertake a Study of Defensive
Security Concepts and Policies

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The 1990s are shaping up as a decade filled with new hopes, worries, and challenges. The final years of the 1980s witnessed the end of the East-West conflict that had dominated international politics for more than 40 years. Cooperation among former adversaries replaced decades of political, ideological and military confrontation, centred foremost in Europe, but extending beyond it to affect all regions of the world. New avenues of cooperation opened up as a result, allowing the United Nations as well as regional organizations to play a more effective role. The increasing willingness of States to turn to regional and other multilateral institutions as a means to resolve conflicts represents a welcome step towards fulfilling the commitment embodied in the Charter of the United Nations to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

2. Encouraging as these trends are, there remain risks and threats - both long-standing and newly emerging - that disturb the climate of international politics. Age-old regional disputes that remained unaffected by the end of the cold war continue to exist, in some cases taking on a new intensity, thus increasing the risks of violence and war. The expression of ethnic, national, cultural and religious differences, long suppressed by the political and ideological confrontation between East and West, is re-emerging. At times, these differences have led to conflicts that may become sources of international instability and unpredictability. Furthermore, the level of armaments in parts of the world still far exceeds what is required for legitimate security and defence needs.

3. In addition, even where the military security of States is no longer an issue of overriding national and international concern, other factors of insecurity persist and grow. Whether these take the form of environmental degradation, extreme poverty, disease and epidemics, drugs, political upheaval, refugees, discrimination and oppression or the systematic suppression of human rights principles and commitments, each represents threats and risks to the security of individuals, communities, societies and, indeed, the world at large. Security in this sense is an all-encompassing concept that is dependent not only on the absence of violence and the effective prevention or removal of aggression, but also on the improvement of basic human and societal needs.

4. These threats increasingly require the vigilant attention of the international community. Many of them can be effectively countered only within the framework of global or regional cooperation. One can expect that progress towards security - in the political and military sense of the word - will release additional economic and human resources that could be partly devoted to the solution of problems of non-military security. In this regard, the United Nations has a critical role to play. 1/

5. These issues are not covered by the mandate of the Group, but in view of their importance are briefly dealt with here in the introduction. It must be

noted, however, that some of these threats may require military means and affect the security of neighbouring States. This could be the case, for example, of political upheavals degenerating into civil wars which might spill over beyond national frontiers.

6. The end of the East-West confrontation combined with the enhanced role for regional and other multilateral institutions and organizations in securing international peace and stability certainly raises prospects for adequate and effective common approaches to cope with the military dimension of existing and emerging threats and risks in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In a world where the maintenance of armed forces beyond genuine security needs and their use for other than defensive purposes continue, these prospects are only likely to be realized if resort to armed force can reliably be restricted to actions legitimized by the Charter of the United Nations.

7. It is in recognition of this interrelationship that the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 45/58 0 of 4 December 1990, entitled "Defensive security concepts and policies", addresses the role of military capabilities and strategic concepts in that field. Recognizing the new opportunities that have emerged for arms control and disarmament, for ending regional conflicts and for developing constructive and cooperative relations among States, the Assembly in its resolution seeks "to ensure that the armed forces of all States exist only to prevent war, as well as for individual and collective self-defence and for collective action in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, and that defensive capabilities reflect true defensive requirements". The practical question is how this can be best translated into reality.

8. The General Assembly sought to address this question in the operative paragraphs of the aforementioned resolution, by stating that it:

> "1. Considers the development of an international dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies to be of great importance for promoting the process of achieving disarmament and strengthening international security;
>
> "2. Invites Member States to initiate or intensify the dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies at the bilateral level, particularly at the regional level and, where appropriate, at the multilateral level;
>
> "3. Requests the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts and taking into account the views of Member States and other relevant information, to undertake a study on defensive security concepts and policies to be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session."

9. This study responds to the request in operative paragraph 3. It explores

whether defensive security concepts and policies might be one way in which to address existing and emerging threats and risks as well as to strengthen the positive developments of recent years. While recognizing the growing importance of other dimensions of security, the study focuses on the military dimension and ways in which its defensive content can be strengthened in an effort to promote international peace and security more generally.

10. With regard to the military component of security, it is acknowledged that what constitutes legitimate defensive military capabilities and force postures is to some extent open to question. A framework for developing common standards is provided by the Charter of the United Nations. Article 2, paragraph 4, states that "Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations". Furthermore, Article 51 states that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Together, these provisions imply an obligation of self-restraint and an emphasis on defence in the development of military capabilities.

11. To be effective, the obligation of self-restraint and defensiveness in military affairs must be readily discernible in both the declarations and the actual military capabilities of States. In other words, it is necessary for States to give practical content to defensive security concepts by pursuing policies that are consistent with the defensive orientation of these concepts and their visible expression of corresponding force postures. These denote the totality of the components that are indispensable for the effectiveness of a military system and comprise doctrine, organization, equipment and armaments, command, control and communications, operational planning and logistics. There is no clear-cut distinction between "concepts" and "policies". Security concepts are the different bases on which States and the international community as a whole rely for their security, such as collective security. Security policies generally are seen as means to maintain security and promote stability and peace through, among other things, the maintenance and development of military capabilities.

12. While exploring the various existing defensive security concepts and policies, and taking into account that each region of the world has its own characteristics and security conditions, as well as political and security requirements, the study aims at determining the general elements in those concepts and policies that could make a useful contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. On the basis of this analysis, the study introduces the notion of "defensive security", which, as a working tool, is defined as a condition of peace and security attained step-by-step and sustained through effective and concrete measures in the political and military fields under which:

(a) Friendly relations among States are established and maintained;

(b) Disputes are settled in a peaceful and equitable manner and the resort to force is consequently excluded;

(c) The capacity for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action is eliminated through verifiable arms control and disarmament, confidence- and security-building measures and a restructuring of armed forces towards a defensive orientation.

13. The study discusses how States might best accomplish this goal. To this end, it is structured as set out in the following paragraphs.

14. Chapter II discusses recent events and current trends in international security in order to explore the political opportunities that may currently exist for the peaceful settlement of disputes and restraint in the development, maintenance and use of armed forces.

15. Chapter III surveys existing studies and models of defensively oriented concepts and policies and analyses political and military aspects of defensive security concepts and policies while taking into account their inherent limitations.

16. Chapter IV deals with political and military-technological problems that may impede the effective implementation of these considerations.

17. Strategies and measures designed to mitigate these problems are discussed in chapter V.

18. Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recommendations derived from and justified by the preceding chapters.

II. CURRENT TRENDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

A. From cold war confrontation to cooperation

19. Throughout the post-war period, the cold war dominated global politics in at least three important respects. First, it divided most of the industrial world into two opposing systems, each led by a major Power. Second, vast economic and human resources were devoted towards military ends. Finally, the cold war was virtually global in nature, affecting to a large extent all countries. During this period, the Non-Aligned Movement was formed in 1961 to provide developing countries with a forum for pursuing common goals and interests away from the polarization of the cold war. Until the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, international politics were greatly influenced by these factors.

20. The degree of interaction between the two opposing systems was limited because confrontation tended to take precedence over cooperation. However, this confrontation - which was contained by fears of escalation in case of military conflict - froze the territorial and political status quo throughout

Europe. Dialogue, including dialogue on arms control, was pursued largely to reduce tensions and was generally limited to areas of mutual concern.

21. During the cold war, security tended to be defined primarily in military terms. The result was most evident in Europe, where large forces were arrayed on either side of the East-West divide.

22. Another feature of the cold war was the competition for influence that developed in other parts of the world, each side trying to take advantage of ethnic or national conflicts or tensions. At the same time, local leaders were tempted to drag the major Powers into the conflict on their respective sides. Such outside involvement tended to lead to the aggravation of regional conflicts by providing opposed parties with military and other means.

23. Partly as a result of the cold war and its extension into other parts of the world, 25 States came together in Belgrade in 1961 to form the Non-Aligned Movement. The Movement charted an independent political course away from the competing major Powers. The Movement played a useful and constructive role in ensuring that, rather than being dominated by issues emanating exclusively from the cold war, the international agenda was broadened to reflect the specific concerns of developing countries. Furthermore, by making the United Nations a primary arena in which to pursue its goals, the Non-Aligned Movement influenced the context in which international issues were addressed, including development issues and disarmament.

24. Patterns of international politics began to change, first slowly - including the dramatic challenge posed by the Solidarity Movement to the communist system in Poland in 1980 - and then with increasing rapidity, in the latter half of the 1980s. The new Soviet leadership brought to power in 1985 realized that the political and economic stagnation that characterized Soviet and East European societies demanded an urgent response. The resultant policies of perestroika and glasnost were based on the belief that their success depended largely on changing economic priorities from the military to the civilian sector and on Western technical and financial assistance. This led to "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy, which consisted in part of an effort to convince the West that the Soviet Union harboured no aggressive intentions.

25. The West welcomed these changes with deep satisfaction and responded positively to policies that permitted the end of the cold war. As a result, Europe's division was ended, cooperation prevailed over confrontation and some regional problems could be addressed with renewed vigour.

26. The end of Europe's division was demonstrated most dramatically by the collapse of the Berlin wall in November 1989 and the subsequent unification of Germany the following October. The unfreezing of the territorial and political status quo was explicitly recognized by the States most directly involved in the cold war in November 1990. In their "Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States" (A/46/68, annex), the members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) affirmed "the end of the era

of division and confrontation" and declared that "in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship."

27. The end of the cold war had major implications for the region. In the East, the Warsaw Treaty Organization was formally dissolved in July 1991, and new patterns of cooperation, consistent with the aspirations of the States concerned to pluralism, democracy and market economy, emerged in its stead. In another historic development, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist in December 1991 when newly independent Republics of the former Soviet Union decided to create the Commonwealth of Independent States. Earlier, the Baltic States had regained their independence.

28. In the West, the North Atlantic Alliance responded to these changes by reaffirming the importance of achieving its objectives by political means, in keeping with Articles 2 and 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO leaders declared that the Alliance's "security policy can now be based on three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defence capability". 2/ These elements were given practical content in the "Alliance's New Strategic Concept", adopted on the same occasion. The commitment to dialogue and cooperation was institutionalized in the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which includes all NATO and former Warsaw Treaty members.

29. The end of the cold war has also resulted in an intensification of European-wide deliberations within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in which Canada and the United States of America also participate. In the Final Act adopted at Helsinki in 1975, the then 35 participating States accepted a number of commitments concerning respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, economic cooperation and social justice, as well as military security. At a number of follow-up meetings and conferences, the implementation of these commitments was discussed and new measures were agreed upon. In this way, the Helsinki process contributed substantially to the new era we are now witnessing in Europe. It has allowed a new quality of political dialogue and cooperation, transforming the CSCE process into a more institutionalized relationship.

30. At the conclusion of the CSCE Summit, held in Paris from 19 to 21 November 1990, the then 34 CSCE member States adopted "The Charter of Paris for a New Europe" (A/45/859, annex), in which they recognized that the "era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended". They also reiterated the continuing validity of the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, stating that these would form the basis of their relations. Finally, the CSCE members agreed to begin the institutionalization of the CSCE process by creating a Council composed of their foreign ministers that would meet at least annually; a Committee of Senior Officials that would meet more frequently; a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) to be based at Vienna; a Secretariat located at Prague; and an Office for Free Elections to be housed at Warsaw (later renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights).

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31. The first significant step in accelerating the process of winding down the military confrontation was the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986. The Conference extended the initial confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed to as part of the Helsinki Final Act in a number of areas. It called for prior notification of military activities above a certain level; specified mandatory invitation of observers from all CSCE States to attend notified military activities; instituted an annual exchange of forecasts regarding all notifiable military activities; and provided for on-site inspections from the air and/or ground to verify compliance with agreed measures without a right of refusal. 3/

32. Aside from the notable increase in transparency that these measures implied, the most remarkable feature of the CDE agreement related to verification, including mandatory on-site inspections. This was the first time that on-site inspections were accepted as an integral part of an arms control verification regime.

33. In the late 1980s, political changes considerably brightened the prospect of significant reductions in conventional forces in Europe. By November 1990, the 22 NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries had agreed in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 4/ to reduce their conventional armaments in the five categories that were considered to be the most critical to offensive actions, to significantly lower levels. When fully implemented, the Treaty will ensure the destruction or permanent removal from Europe of over 125,000 tanks, artillery pieces, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. In addition to the force limitations and required reductions, the other major contribution of the CFE Treaty consists of its information exchange and verification provisions. Together with the new CSBMs agreed to in Vienna in 1990 and 1992, which expand on the Stockholm Document in a number of areas, these provisions will ensure a high degree of transparency in the organization and deployment of military forces throughout the European continent.

34. The CFE Treaty reverses a decades-long build-up of conventional military power in Europe and goes a long way towards achieving the objective, first set out in the mandate to the negotiations and repeated subsequently in the Treaty's preamble,

> "of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe".

35. The military confrontation has also been reversed as regards the nuclear capabilities of the two major Powers. In December 1987, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), 5/ which eliminated their ground-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,000 kilometres. Four years

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later, in July 1991, the two countries signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), 6/ under which both sides will reduce their strategic offensive nuclear weapons by about 30 per cent from current levels - the first-ever reductions agreed to as a part of a strategic nuclear arms control agreement. The extensive verification regimes in the INF and START treaties encompass national technical means, routine and challenge on-site inspections and operational constraints affecting heavy bombers and mobile missiles.

36. More far-reaching nuclear reductions have emerged since the signing of the START Treaty. In September 1991, President George Bush of the United States announced sweeping unilateral changes in strategic and tactical nuclear forces. A week later, then President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union responded positively to this announcement. Under the initiatives, ground-based tactical nuclear weapons will be eliminated, and all non-strategic nuclear weapons have been removed from surface vessels, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Many of these weapons will be dismantled; the remainder will be secured in central areas on United States and Russian territory. With regard to strategic forces, the two countries agreed to take heavy bombers off alert status, to cancel a number of strategic and air-launched missile programmes and to deactivate some land-based missiles. Following these initiatives, and in response to further dramatic changes in the security environment, NATO and the Russian Federation announced additional reductions in their remaining sub-strategic nuclear forces. As a result, sub-strategic nuclear forces on both sides have been reduced by roughly 80 per cent.

37. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, further nuclear arms reductions became possible. After just five months of negotiations, the United States and Russia agreed in June 1992 to reduce their respective strategic nuclear arms by 70 per cent from current levels. Under the agreement, both sides would each deploy no more than 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, eliminate all multi-warhead land-based missiles and limit the number of warheads at sea to 1,750 on each side. These levels must be reached by 2003 at the latest, but they may be achieved by 2000 provided the United States can assist the Russian Federation with the task of destroying the forces to be reduced.

38. The totality of the arms control achievements to date represent a dramatic reversal of the arms race that characterized the East-West conflict since its inception. The net effect of the combination of agreements is increased security at lower cost and force levels for all States party to them. In addition, the verification regimes put in place by the agreements expose all countries to intrusive inspections that will not only discourage non-compliance but also provide mutual information on armed forces, military activities and force planning in each of these countries. The result is increased transparency of military activities and capabilities and enhanced mutual confidence. These agreements together represent a major step towards creating a monitored security area throughout the European continent.

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B. An enhanced role for regional cooperation and the United Nations

39. The move from the cold war to cooperation has done more than unfreezing the status quo in Europe; a more general thawing is taking place on a global level. The international security environment is at present characterized by a positive evolution in some areas of the world. In those areas, conflicts are being resolved largely through peaceful means, and compromises acceptable to all sides in a dispute seem in many instances to be more readily at hand or acceptable. The new opportunities, as well as the added demands for addressing international disputes, have raised the potential for multilateral approaches to conflict resolution, both at the global and the regional levels.

40. Regional organizations and forums have been provided with a greater opportunity to play a role in settling international differences in their respective regions. In Central America, the "Contadora Process" played a vital role in forging agreement among the five Central American Governments to settle their internal and external disputes and conflicts. In South-East Asia, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was instrumental in getting the peace process going in Cambodia. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) has started to play a serious role in addressing regional situations, particularly those relating to the Middle East. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has been involved in mediating disputes in a number of areas. And in Europe, regional organizations are facing a serious challenge in this regard in the Yugoslav crisis.

41. In addition, the present cooperative attitude among the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, has in many instances unblocked the mechanisms enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations for effectively addressing international disputes, thus allowing the United Nations to play an active role in the settlement of many disputes. This increased role of the United Nations is also demonstrated by the fact that while the United Nations launched 13 peace-keeping operations through its first 43 years of existence, an equal number of such operations have been launched since 1988. Working often in concert with regional organizations, the United Nations has played an active role in such areas as Central America, South-East Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A brief survey of some of these efforts underscores the recently enhanced role of multilateral institutions.

1. Central America

42. Efforts to resolve the internal and international conflicts in Central America were first undertaken by States in the region. In 1983, the so-called "Contadora Group", composed of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, initiated consultations with five Central American Governments (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) to find a negotiated solution to the political problems of the region. Despite the creation of a Support Group consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay in 1985, progress on

the issues remained elusive until the five Central American Governments proved willing to tackle the issues themselves.

43. This happened in February 1987, when President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica set out a plan for the region. The "Arias Plan" formed the basis of the agreement on "Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America" signed by the five Central American Presidents at Guatemala City, on 7 August 1987 at the Esquipulas II summit meeting (A/42/521-S/19085, annex). In the Esquipulas II agreement the five concerned Central American countries agreed to launch a process of democratization in their countries, promote a national dialogue, decree a general amnesty, bring about a genuine cease-fire and hold free and fair elections. They also requested all concerned to halt their support for irregular forces and insurrectional movements and to reiterate their earlier commitment to prevent the use of their own territory for destabilization of other countries in the region. In order to achieve these objectives, the countries set up an International Verification and Follow-up Commission composed of the ministers for foreign affairs of the Contadora and Support Groups, the ministers for foreign affairs of the five Central American countries and the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

44. In order to implement the Esquipulas II agreement it was necessary to resolve three issues, all of which the United Nations was asked to undertake. First, to implement the process of democratization, the Government of Nicaragua agreed to call for free and fair elections, to revise its electoral laws and procedures and to invite international observers of the elections. The latter was undertaken by the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verification of the Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN). This was the first time the United Nations had been invited to monitor elections in a sovereign State and represented the first major United Nations operation in the western hemisphere. 7/

45. Second, in order to verify compliance with the security commitments of the agreement - including a halt to aid to irregular forces and insurrectional movements and a commitment not to allow the territory of one State to be used for attacks on another - the Security Council agreed on 7 November 1989, in resolution 644 (1989), to create the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).

46. Finally, in December 1989 the five Central American Governments requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to expand the mandate of ONUCA to include verification of any cease-fire and the demobilization of irregular forces that might be agreed to in the region. Following the elections in Nicaragua on 25 February 1990, the new Government asked the Secretary-General to assist in the voluntary demobilization of the members of Nicaragua's resistance. In March 1990, the Security Council agreed, in resolution 650 (1990), to expand ONUCA's mandate, giving it the responsibility of taking delivery and disposing of the weapons, *matériel* and military equipment of the resistance. This mission was completed in June 1990.

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47. The success of the United Nations in dealing with the situation in Nicaragua subsequently led the Security Council, in resolution 654 (1990), to welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General to promote the achievement of a negotiated political solution to the conflict in El Salvador. These efforts resulted in agreement between the two parties that the United Nations would monitor any accords reached between them, including one concerning human rights that was agreed to in July 1990. 8/ On 20 May 1991, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), created by the Security Council under resolution 693 (1991) at the request of both sides in the Salvadoran conflict, entered El Salvador to begin the task of monitoring the human rights agreement.

48. A settlement to the conflict in El Salvador was reached in September 1991, when the two sides met in New York for negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary- General. The "New York Agreement" (A/46/502-S/23082, annex) called, inter alia, for the establishment of a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace - to be composed of representatives of the Government, the FMLN, political parties, churches and the United Nations - to carry out the accords. The Accords called for the "purification" of the armed forces, a reduction in the size of the army, no discrimination for former FMLN combatants who apply for membership in the new police force to be created under civilian leadership, and the right of FMLN families and sympathizers to hold onto lands they have previously occupied.

49. Final details of the settlement were reached in negotiations at the United Nations, on 31 December 1991. A Treaty (the Peace Agreement) to this effect was signed on 16 January 1992 (A/46/864-S/23501, annex). In this connection, the Security Council decided in resolution 729 (1992) to expand the mandate of ONUSAL to include the verification and monitoring of the implementation of all the agreements, in particular the Agreement on the Cessation of the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on the Establishment of a National Civil Police. 9/

2. South-East Asia

50. Regional efforts to find a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Cambodia were initiated by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The initiative gained momentum in 1988 with the holding, in Indonesia, for the first time, of an informal meeting of the Cambodian parties involved in the conflict. The meeting, known as the Jakarta Informal Meeting I (JIM I), was also attended by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Following further regional efforts, the Paris Conference on Cambodia was convened in August 1989 under the co-chairmanship of France and Indonesia and in the presence of the Secretary-General. Although all Cambodian parties had agreed to accept free and fair elections in the exercise of the right to self-determination of the Cambodian people, a serious dispute concerning power-sharing arrangements during the transitional period leading to the elections remained unresolved.

51. To break the deadlock, further efforts to find a comprehensive political settlement were focused on a proposal by Australia, taking into account the broad understandings reached through previous regional efforts. The elements of that proposal included the establishment of a Supreme National Council under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, as the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia would be enshrined. The proposal also anticipated the delegation of authority by the Supreme National Council to a United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to prepare and conduct the elections. In order to create a neutral political environment necessary for the conduct of elections, UNTAC would supervise the running of key ministries, including defence, foreign affairs, public security, finance and information. In addition, United Nations peace-keeping forces would be responsible for verifying the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, a cease-fire agreement and a halt to arms supplies to the Cambodian parties.

52. The permanent members of the Security Council have also made an important contribution to the efforts towards a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in Cambodia. Elaborating on the progress reached through the regional efforts, they developed a framework for the political settlement (known as the "framework document") which included the formation of a Supreme National Council (SNC). At a meeting in Jakarta in September 1990, the Cambodian parties accepted the "framework document" in its entirety as the basis for settling the conflict in Cambodia. After its subsequent endorsement by the Security Council in its resolution 668 (1990), the "framework document" was elaborated into draft agreements.

53. Since mid-1991, efforts to reach a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict in Cambodia have accelerated. The Cambodian parties themselves played a major role in a series of meetings of the SNC. In June 1991, they reached agreement on an indefinite cease-fire and a halt to foreign arms supplies; in July, they agreed to invite a special United Nations team to visit the country to supervise the cease-fire, and decided that the Cambodian seat in the United Nations would be occupied by the SNC; in August, the parties agreed to reduce the number of troops and weapons in the Cambodian army and the resistance forces by 70 per cent and to deploy the remaining soldiers and equipment in cantonments to be supervised by the United Nations; and finally, in September, the Cambodian parties reached agreement on how to conduct elections - the last major obstacle to an overall accord. These achievements paved the way for the reconvening of the Paris Conference on Cambodia and the signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict on 23 October 1991 (see A/46/608-S/23177, annex).

54. Against the backdrop of the vastly improved international political and security climate, as well as the gradual transformation of military structures and nuclear strategies that are now underway, ASEAN, in its Summit Conference held in Singapore on 27 and 28 January 1992, welcomed the accession by all countries in South-East Asia to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in order to provide a common framework for cooperation; endorsed the role of existing

forums and intra-ASEAN dialogue to enhance cooperation in security matters; expressed the determination to realize the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and a South-East Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone; and recognized the centrality of the United Nations role in the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. Africa

55. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has since its inception mediated and settled regional disputes and, wherever possible, it has done so in active cooperation with the United Nations. OAU's efforts have largely been made through the informal mechanism of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, acting either collectively or by mandate of the serving Chairman of the Organization rather than through the formal organ specifically set up for that purpose and known as the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. Notable OAU efforts in the last 10 years are described below:

(a) The conflict between Chad and Libya was mediated by OAU, and in 1981 led to the Organization's first attempt at peace-keeping - only Nigeria sent troops to Chad but they were later withdrawn due to difficulties in cost-sharing by member States;

(b) The current intra-state conflict in Rwanda has lately abated due largely to the OAU mediatory intervention;

(c) The Sudan talks held in Abuja last May were part of OAU's efforts at solving the nine-year-old internal strife in southern Sudan;

(d) In West Africa, the situation between Ghana and Togo has been eased in the last five years through the timely intervention of influential member States in the subregion, acting in the common interest of OAU;

(e) In 1988, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was instrumental in alleviating tensions between Burkina Faso and Ghana;

(f) In addition, the current ECOWAS monitoring effort in Liberia known as ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has greatly contributed to bringing the warring factions closer to peace.

56. Some of OAU's efforts are either complementary or have served as propellers to those of the United Nations, for instance, the two cases of Western Sahara and Somalia.

57. In August 1988, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) accepted a joint proposal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Chairman of OAU to hold a referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. The proposal stipulated that the referendum would be organized and supervised by the United Nations in cooperation with OAU. In April 1991, the

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Security Council, in resolution 690 (1991), approved the establishment of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to administer and supervise the referendum. A cease-fire agreement was signed in June of the same year and went into effect three months later when MINURSO arrived in the region. The United Nations-supervised referendum originally scheduled to take place in January 1992 has been postponed until such time as Morocco and Frente POLISARIO have resolved their differences on the question of criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum. In June 1992, representatives of both Morocco and Frente POLISARIO participated in separate consultations in Nigeria in order to find ways and means of resolving the situation.

58. The basis for the settlement of the question of Namibia, ending its occupation by South Africa, was Security Council resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 1978. In late 1988, South Africa accepted the terms of the resolution in exchange for Cuba's agreement to withdraw its forces from Angola. An accord to this effect was signed by South Africa, Angola and Cuba on 22 December 1988. With the Angolan accords signed, the cease-fire between the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) and South African forces was set to go into effect on 1 April 1989, thereby setting in motion the seven-month programme leading to the independence elections. The civilian component of UNTAG was put into place in May 1989 to supervise voter registration and organize the elections. Elections were held on schedule in early November, giving SWAPO a majority of the seats in the Constituent Assembly. A constitution was agreed to thereafter, and full Namibian independence was established on 21 March 1990.

59. Furthermore, in an effort to bring current United Nations efforts in Somalia to fruition, Nigeria has given former President Siad Barre temporary political asylum.

60. In an attempt to refine its aforementioned informal method of conflict prevention and resolution, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of Africa adopted in 1990 the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and on the Fundamental Changes taking Place in the World, in which they committed themselves, inter alia, to the peaceful and speedy resolution of all conflicts through the establishment of a comprehensive and permanent system or machinery for the twin functions of peacemaking and peace-keeping. To concretize and institutionalize the new thinking, the Council of Ministers in 1991 approved an appropriation in the budget to be used for conflict resolution and, by March 1992, a Division on Conflict Management was set up within the OAU General Secretariat to assist the Secretary-General, on a permanent basis, in the tasks of conflict prevention and resolution in consultation with member States.

61. The envisaged OAU permanent mechanism consists of four organs as follows: 10/

(a) Office of the Secretary-General

Backed by the General Secretariat, the Office of the Secretary-General is expected to act as an early-warning system in conflict prevention through the monitoring of latent and potential conflict situations and as a mediator in the resolution of conflicts. The early-warning system will be the repository of a conflict-related database and information put at the disposal of the Secretary-General, the analysis of which will form the basis of the Secretary-General's recommendations to the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Secretary-General will subsequently implement decisions in conflict prevention and resolution taken by the Bureau.

(b) Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government

This organ is favoured above other existing or newly proposed ones because of its manageable size and past experience. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government will entrust the Bureau with the responsibility of dealing with conflict situations. The Bureau will assume, on behalf of the Assembly, the overall supervision of conflict prevention and resolution and will be the supreme organ responsible for peacemaking and peace-keeping operations. The Bureau, which will meet at the request of the Chairman or the Secretary-General of OAU, will be composed of the Chairman and eight other members representing the five regions in accordance with the established practice. The Bureau will exercise its mandate between the ordinary sessions of the Assembly and is to meet at the level of Heads of State and Government whenever possible. Otherwise, it will meet at the level of Ministers or Ambassadors.

(c) Defence Commission

The relevance of the Defence Commission regards essentially conflict resolution through peace-keeping operations. The Bureau of the Commission is expected to make recommendations on the training and harmonization of the different components of a possible inter-African peace-keeping force to be identified at the national level for possible deployment in conflict situations.

(d) Interim Arbitral Tribunal

The Interim Arbitral Tribunal is to arbitrate on issues of a legal nature, such as the interpretation of treaties and the determination of fishing rights and border claims, pending the establishment of an African Court of Justice.

4. Middle East

62. The United Nations has had a long-standing role in the Middle East, a region where conflict has been endemic for most of the post-war period. The Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular, with the question of Palestine at its

core, has been an area of United Nations involvement since its early years, and the subject of numerous United Nations resolutions covering both its territorial political dimension and transcending peacemaking and peace-keeping operations. These resolutions have, inter alia, affirmed the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories; the necessity to guarantee the security of all States within internationally recognized borders and to terminate states of belligerency; the illegal character of Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories; and the necessity of convening an International Peace Conference on the Middle East.

63. While regrettably this conflict remains unresolved, it is noteworthy to underline that the framework for all peace efforts in the Middle East since 1967 has continued to be Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is also noteworthy that the peace process on the Middle East, initiated in Madrid in October 1991, which the General Assembly welcomed in its resolution 46/75 of 11 December 1991, has since then commenced both its bilateral and multilateral tracks. In the meantime, the United Nations peace-keeping forces and observers continue to play an invaluable role in preventing the exacerbation of the conflict as they are deployed in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the Golan Heights (UNDOF) and the Sinai desert (UNTSO).

64. United Nations peace-keeping forces have also been deployed in other parts of the region, on the Iran-Iraq border, and more recently, along the Iraq-Kuwait border. This last mission was a direct result of the most intense use of United Nations mechanisms in recent history, which followed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. During the course of the conflict, the Security Council passed a total of 15 resolutions, which dealt with such issues as: the imposition of mandatory sanctions (resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990), the enforcement of these sanctions by means of a naval, air and land blockade (resolutions 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990 and 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990), and, most dramatically, the authorization to Member States to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement [previous resolutions] and to restore international peace and security in the area" if Iraq failed to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 (resolution 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990). Iraq's refusal to comply with this and previous resolutions resulted in its forceful ouster from Kuwait by a United States-led coalition of forces.

65. The role of the United Nations expanded considerably in the aftermath of that war. In addition to the United Nations observer unit established to monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border, the cease-fire resolution passed by the Security Council on 3 April 1991 (resolution 687 (1991)) invested the United Nations with the responsibility to administer a fund to pay for compensations, which would be drawn from future Iraqi export earnings. In addition, under section C of the resolution, the United Nations took on the task, through the creation of a United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), to inspect and seize Iraq's capability for producing weapons of mass destruction, including existing stocks of weapons, as well as ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometres. UNSCOM is also responsible

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for destroying chemical and biological weapons and production capabilities, for verifying destruction by Iraq of banned ballistic missiles, and, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons-usable materials. Once this task is completed, UNSCOM and IAEA will be responsible for future monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the provisions of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). 11/ The involvement of the United Nations in the disarmament of Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and missile capabilities constitutes a remarkable effort on the part of the United Nations regarding facility inspection, verification of compliance and destruction of weapons.

66. In recent years the Organization of the Islamic Conference has taken a serious role in addressing regional situations and issues, particularly those relating to the Middle East. The Organization has exerted diplomatic efforts in resolving a wide range of other regional and international problems. These include ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation in Afghanistan, the plight of Myanmar refugees, etc. Most importantly, it has served to get its member States together on a regular basis, which has had the very positive effect of reducing suspicions and promoting trust and friendly relations among them.

5. Europe

67. Since the transformations in Europe in 1989, the various frameworks dealing with the situation in that region faced their first test when the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991. In the course of responding to these and other developments, the States participating in the CSCE process, the European Community (EC) and the North Atlantic Alliance adjusted their practices and mechanisms for dealing with conflict in Europe. In Helsinki, CSCE institutions and structures established by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (A/45/859, annex) were further developed in order to enhance the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis management. At the CSCE Summit held at Helsinki on 9 and 10 July 1992 the Helsinki document "The Challenge of Change" was adopted, which strengthened the role of the CSCE Council of Ministers with its Chairman in Office, as well as the Committee of Senior Officials, acting as its agent, devising means to assist them. The CSCE capacity in the field of early warning was strengthened in particular by the activities of the newly established High Commissioner on National Minorities. Provisions for CSCE peace-keeping according to agreed modalities were also adopted. CSCE peace-keeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort to arrive at a political solution. In this respect the CSCE may benefit from the resources and experience and expertise of existing organizations such as EC, NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peace-keeping activities. A CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation was also established to give new impetus to the process of arms

control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, to the enhancement of consultation and cooperation on security matters and to furthering the process of reducing the risk of conflict. Efforts in these fields are to be coherent, interrelated and complementary.

68. The European Community and its member States have strengthened their ability to act in a coordinated manner by establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is to be implemented after ratification of the Treaty on Political Union signed at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted a new strategic concept and strengthened its role as an integral part of security in Europe. Through the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) it has established patterns of cooperation with new partners in Europe and Eurasia in harmony with the goals of CSCE.

69. The Yugoslav crisis was the first time that the CSCE mechanisms agreed to in Paris in November 1990 and in Berlin the following June could be put into effect. One such mechanism concerns "unusual military activities" of military forces outside their peacetime locations that are militarily significant. At the request of the Government of Austria the consultative committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre met to discuss the crisis. An emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials was also convened at the CSCE secretariat in Prague on 3 July 1991. The member States decided to give the European Community the task of finding a solution to the conflict.

70. The Community's effort proved only partly successful. Meeting on the island of Brioni on 8 July 1991, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Slovenia agreed to accept a compromise proposed by the Community that, inter alia, involved: the suspension of implementation of the Slovenian and Croatian independence declarations, though not the declarations themselves; an immediate end to all hostilities; an order to federal armed forces to return to their bases; the deactivation of the Slovenian militia and the lifting of Slovenian blockades of federal armed units; and a three-month cooling-off period, during which time there would be negotiations among the six Republics and two autonomous provinces. Seventy monitors from EC countries were dispatched to monitor implementation of these provisions.

71. Although the Brioni Agreement contributed to diffusing the situation in Slovenia, it did not halt the fighting in Croatia. A peace conference, convened at The Hague was unable to halt the fighting. Since September 1991, the United Nations at the request of EC has become actively involved alongside EC in seeking a solution to the Yugoslav crisis. A plan for United Nations peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia drawn up by the Secretary-General was accepted by the Serbian Government, the Government of Croatia and the Federal Armed Forces on 2 January 1992. A cease-fire was also agreed.

72. In resolution 743 (1992), the Security Council decided to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia. The first peace-keeping units arrived almost immediately thereafter. 12/ By July 1992, UNPROFOR was fully deployed in the eastern and southern parts of Croatia along

the borders of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to supervise implementation of cease-fire agreements in these regions. Furthermore, the Sarajevo airport was reopened under UNPROFOR protection after the adoption of Security Council resolutions 758 (1992) and 761 (1992), in order to allow for humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina by way of airlifts. These resolutions were adopted following the deterioration of the situation on the ground, in particular in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Parallel to these activities, CSCE declared Serbia in mid-April 1992 to be mainly responsible for the deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia and warned it not to persist with its clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments. In May 1992, Yugoslavia was for that reason temporarily suspended from participating in the decision-making process of CSCE, and on 8 July it was excluded altogether from participating in any CSCE meeting.

73. Unfortunately the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia was not the only serious crisis Europe had to face. With the admission into CSCE of the former Soviet Republics during the meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers at Prague in January 1992, tensions and conflicts erupting in Nagorno-Karabakh and Moldova in particular, became regular topics on the CSCE political agenda. A peace conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the chairmanship of Italy, to be held at Minsk, which had been decided upon in March 1991, had not been able to convene as of the time of the completion of this study.

C. Existing and emerging threats and risks

74. Notwithstanding recent encouraging trends toward resolving outstanding conflicts through peaceful means, many States continue to face traditional threats to their security. Weapons of mass destruction still pose a serious threat. In many parts of the world, violations of international law, competing territorial claims, aggressive behaviour, and mutual suspicion of aggressive intentions remain sources of conflict. In most cases, these conflicts are fuelled by the acquisition of military capabilities far in excess of legitimate security needs of the countries concerned. The resulting arms race adds to mutual suspicions and thus reduces security for all. Increased threats to security can also be posed by ethnic, national, cultural or religious differences within States, which could lead to the outbreak of violence and have inter- as well as intra-State implications.

75. In addition to these traditional military threats to security, non-military threats to individual, societal, national and global security are also mounting, as indicated in chapter I above.

III. THE SUBSTANCE AND MAIN FEATURES OF DEFENSIVE SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

76. The maintenance of armed forces in the modern world is legitimized by the right of individual and collective self-defence. Governments raise armies, build weapon systems and use armed forces all in the name of defence. Yet, while two adversarial States are likely to justify their own military preparations in defensive terms, they will probably view each other's preparations as conveying aggressive or offensive intentions. How, in these circumstances, can one determine which military postures and activities are more defensive and which are more offensive in nature?

77. In the past, there have been various attempts to answer this question by searching for clear and unambiguous criteria that would distinguish offensive from defensive military strategies and forces. Underlying these attempts has been the assumption that there is a close connection between defence as an objective and defence as a military operation. 13/

78. The first major effort to establish clear criteria distinguishing offensive from defensive capabilities was undertaken during the World Disarmament Conference held at Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations from 1932 to 1934. The goal of this Conference was in particular to effect qualitative disarmament, which the General Commission of the Conference defined as "the selection of certain classes or descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalized by means of a general convention". The objective of qualitative disarmament, so defined, was

> "that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special Commissions with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive or those most efficacious against national defense or most threatening to civilians". 14/

The reasons for the failure of three special Commissions of the Conference to agree to common definitions of what constituted "offensive" weapons were varied. One such reason was the inherent difficulty of defining weapons and weapons systems without considering the context in which they would be used.

79. Since the early 1980s, peace researchers in Western Europe have formulated specific models designed to eliminate the "offensive" nature of military force postures throughout Europe by emphasizing "defensive" over "offensive" capabilities. The terminology and underlying assumptions that emerged from these efforts were taken up by the Soviet Union. Starting in 1986, Soviet officials from former President Mikhail Gorbachev on down declared their intention to change Soviet military doctrine in the direction of "defensive defence", including a force posture based on the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" for defence.

80. Combined with the improvement in East-West relations discussed in

chapter II above, these developments further promoted the idea that international security at the bilateral, regional and global levels could be strengthened by a greater emphasis on the defensive orientation of military force postures of all States. The present chapter reviews major ideas that have emerged since the early 1980s in support of this proposition.

A. Survey of studies

81. The purpose of the present section is simply to summarize the main assumptions, arguments and conclusions of the proponents of "non-offensive defence" in order to determine their value to this study as a whole.

82. The terms that emerged in the 1980s to describe the various models, concepts, ideas and theorems that stressed the importance of emphasizing defence are numerous. These include terms such as "non-offensive defence", "non-provocative defence", "defensive defence", "defence dominance", "structural inability to attack", "reasonable sufficiency", etc. While each of these terms might have been defined by various people in specific and slightly differentiated ways, all are based on similar ideas.

83. The notion of "reasonable sufficiency" was originally introduced in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries in the early 1970s. It was again taken up by the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s to describe the level of forces deemed adequate for achieving the defensive objectives of the new Soviet military doctrine. In 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev defined this concept as follows:

> "We see the way to secure reasonable sufficiency in this: that the States would not possess military forces and armaments above the level that is indispensable for an effective defense, and also in this: that their military forces have a structure that would provide all necessary means for repulsing potential aggression but at the same time would not permit them to be used for the unfolding of offensive missions." 15/

84. Soviet military doctrine had both a political and a military-technical aspect. The former referred to the general security objectives of the State. These had always been phrased in purely defensive terms. However, it was not until the enunciation of a new doctrine in the mid- to late 1980s, that the military-technical aspects of Soviet military thinking emphasized that these defensive objectives could best be accomplished through a defensive strategy based on the concept of "reasonable sufficiency". Thus, the draft military doctrine of the Soviet Union issued in late 1990 stated that sufficiency in the sphere of conventional forces consisted of a "minimum quantity ... necessary for ensuring reliable defense, but insufficient for conducting large-scale offensive operations". 16/

85. The emphasis on maintaining the minimum quantity "necessary for ensuring a reliable defense" underscored that the level of forces prescribed by the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" was to be related to the level of forces

possessed by the potential adversary. Thus, the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization stated in 1987, "the state of military-strategic parity ... remains a decisive factor for preventing war." 17/ At the same time, the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" also underscored the necessity of ensuring that a military equilibrium be achieved at progressively lower levels of forces.

86. With the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the territory of the former USSR, six of its members - Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - concluded a Treaty on collective security at the meeting of the CIS in Tashkent in May 1992. They proclaimed that their military doctrine would have a defensive orientation. Russia, which has the most powerful military potential in this group of States, declared that it would base its national military doctrine on the principle of defensive sufficiency, which the May 1992 draft of the Military Doctrine of Russia defines as:

> "a posture of armed forces of a State (a coalition of States) that is capable of preventing and containing aggression by a potential enemy, but does not enable the launching of large-scale offensive operations without additional deployments of troops (forces) and other measures to reinforce its combat potential." 18/

87. "Non-offensive defence" refers to a type of military force posture that emphasizes defensive capabilities and eschews offensive or provocative capabilities. Definitions of the concept vary, but all contain common elements. Three particularly cogent definitions, proposed respectively by Dutch, Norwegian and German proponents of "non-offensive defence", are:

> "A military posture in which the strategic and operational concept, the deployment, organization, armaments, communications and command, logistics and training of the armed forces are such that they are in their totality unambiguously capable of an adequate conventional defence, but as unambiguously incapable of a bordercrossing attack, be it an invasion or a destructive strike at the opponent's territory." 19/

> "A structure which poses no threat to the opponent on his own territory, which is immune to destruction by pre-emptive attack, which has a reasonable chance of successfully denying the opponent hostile access to the defended nation, and which would produce minimal damage to the defending society in the process of repelling an invasion." 20/

> "The build-up, training, logistics and doctrine of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be unsuitable for offence, but unambiguously sufficient for a credible conventional defence." 21/

88. From these statements, it is clear that proponents of the concepts of "non-offensive defence" stress the importance of structuring a State's armed forces in a manner that unambiguously conveys their defensive orientation.

This should be reflected both in the doctrine or strategic concept that guides military operations at the strategic level and in how armed forces are deployed, trained, equipped, supported and commanded. Above all, the proponents maintain that the strategic concept guiding military operations and the armed forces, while providing for an effective defence, should emphasize a State's inability to pose a threat to the territory of another State.

89. The elaborate models for a "non-offensive defence" that emerged in Europe, though they differ in specifics, are all based on a central belief of their proponents, namely that military postures constructed upon the assumption that "attack is the best form of defence" are inherently destabilizing, since the type of forces needed to implement these offensive strategies are the same as those required for outright acts of aggression. The fact that a State's armed forces emphasize offensive capabilities does not necessarily reflect the harbouring of hostile intentions towards neighbouring countries; however, the potential threat posed by the capability to launch a large-scale attack or invasion generates fears and suspicions that are likely to lead to an unchecked arms race. If intentions are also misread, then war by miscalculation could ensue, thus undermining the possibility of political management of international crises.

90. The principle of "non-offensive defence" is intended to obviate this dilemma. By deliberately reducing the "threat element" in defence policies to a minimum, a "non-offensive defence" posture seeks to reconcile the goal of maintaining an adequate and reliable defence with the goal of building confidence and relaxing political tensions.

91. Discussions and model-building exercises related to concepts of "non-offensive defence" have mainly been devoted to problems in the East-West context. Not surprisingly, corresponding proposals were put forward primarily in countries where military force concentrations and the risk of nuclear escalation were most evident. However, they were not in a position to create realistic alternatives to the formally adopted postures and did not provide comprehensive practical solutions. Nevertheless, advocates of "non-offensive defence" concepts in Germany - and later in Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland - have certainly helped to promote the core idea of "defensive sufficiency" and "reasonable sufficiency" in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

92. While the various models of "non-offensive defence" differ in their specifics, their proponents share three basic assumptions:

(a) Heavy armoured forces, particularly if deployed in forward locations, are inherently offensive and provocative because they combine a high degree of mobility, firepower and protection;

(b) The vulnerability of crucial military assets invites pre-emption by the opponent;

(c) Military capabilities that threaten the territorial integrity of the opponent are provocative.

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93. Specific models advanced to overcome these potentially provocative elements in military force structures can be grouped into four categories, each representing a different defensive concept: area defence; wide-area covering defence; fire-barrier defence; and integrated and interactive forward defence. 22/ Brief examples of these models are provided below:

(a) Area defence: The principal objective of an area defence is to deny the aggressor the possibility of winning decisive battles through a strategy of attrition. The model entails the deployment of so-called "techno-commandos" composed of small and mobile armed units that would be stationed throughout the defended area, save for highly populated areas where the struggle would be carried on through non-violent means. Each unit would be responsible for defending an area of approximately 10 to 15 square kilometres. The units would be equipped with advanced-technology mines, anti-tank guided weapons and rockets designed to attack large armoured concentrations massing along the front for a breakthrough offensive. The units would be backed up by an artillery network capable of concentrated fire against advancing armoured forces which, in turn, would be backed up by traditional armoured units designed to cope with a potential breakthrough by the aggressor.

(b) Wide-area covering defence: This model divides defending forces into two groups - the "shield" and the "sword". The "shield" forces, which would be deployed in border areas of some 75 kilometres in depth, would consist of light infantry brigades and regiments. Their task would be to wear down an attacking force and, by using the characteristics of terrain to the defence's advantage, channel the advancing forces towards concentrated fire positions provided by the "sword." The "sword" forces, which would be deployed in the rear, would consist of traditional armoured brigades capable of concentrating fire against the aggressor's advancing tank forces.

(c) Fire-barrier defence: The fire-barrier model envisions a layered defence. The first layer would consist of a fire wall - a small zone along the border (of some five kilometres in depth) that, upon penetration, would be saturated with remotely controlled mines, missiles and rockets. Immediately behind the fire wall, small units of light infantry forces armed with precision-guided munitions would seek to counter any breakthrough attempts by the aggressor. These would be backed up by fewer but more heavily armoured units capable of meeting forces that had broken through the first two defensive layers. Finally, territorial defence units would operate in the rear to provide for a militia-type defence capability.

(d) Interactive and integrated forward defence: This model is also known as the "Spider-in-the-Web" because of the way in which the defender uses its capabilities to try to exhaust and confine the "insect", or attacker. The "web" consists of several small units, each responsible for defending a designated area and armed with mines, bazookas and short-range indirect fire weapons. These web units would have four tasks: to delay and wear down the aggressor; to provide communication links and information to the "spider" units; to give physical and electronic cover to spider units; and to support

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spider units logistically. A smaller number of spider units, consisting of mobile forces designed to move around the "web", would fall into three categories: shock troops for tactical counter-attack; infantry mounted on light armoured vehicles; and anti-tank cavalry. Their tasks would be: to delay, channel and destroy attacking forces in cooperation with the web units; to perform blocking actions; to conduct counter-strikes against invading forces that have penetrated the defence; and to aid the web units as needed. This model therefore allows for some counter-attack capability, which is constrained, however, by the fact that the "spiders" cannot leave the "web" or defended area.

94. Although the proposals and models for a "non-offensive defence" originated in Europe, a number of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and intergovernmental declarations have been in force, which, by calling for the elimination of some or all types of weapons of mass destruction in a region or area, may be considered as supporting the idea of "non-offensive defence". Notable examples of these treaties and declarations include: the Antarctic Treaty (1959); the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967); the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America with Additional Protocols I and II (1967); the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (1971); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (1972); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1985); the Agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy (1991); the Mendoza Accord on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons (1991); the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (1964); the declaration of a zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic (1986); and the Cartagena Declaration on the Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1991).

95. In addition, ideas and proposals for arrangements that aim at reducing weapons of mass destruction have been put forward in various regions that when realized could further the creation of conditions towards the implementation of defensive security concepts. Notable examples of such proposals include: the proposal of Iran and Egypt of 1974 to establish in the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone; the proposal by Indonesia of 1983 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia to enhance the declaration of ASEAN in 1971 declaring the region a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality; the action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order proposed by India in 1988 to establish in stages a world free of weapons of mass destruction, reduce conventional forces to minimum defensive levels and create a comprehensive global security system; the proposal by Egypt of 1990 to establish in the Middle East a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction; the proposal by Pakistan of 1991 to convene a meeting between India, Pakistan, China, the United States and the former Soviet Union to discuss the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia with the aim of arriving at an agreement establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the

region; the draft Treaty on Central American Security of 1991 by Honduras, which calls for a commitment by all States in the region to refrain from acquiring, maintaining or permitting the stationing in their territories of all weapons of mass destruction.

B. "Defensive security"

96. "Defensive security", as defined in paragraph 12 above, goes beyond the more limited notions, like "non-offensive defence" and "reasonable sufficiency", described in the previous pages. It encompasses both political and military elements aimed at ensuring that all States conduct their policies in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and adopt a military posture and a level of forces that, while ensuring an effective defence, pose no threat to other States. It must be stressed however, that the modalities of defensive security policies will, in practice, depend on the security situation prevailing in each particular region and the perceptions of the States concerned in this regard.

1. Aims of "defensive security"

97. The aim of "defensive security" is to achieve a condition of peace and security in the world in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

98. The concept of "defensive security" is based on the recognition that its achievement depends upon creating the political and military conditions necessary for eliminating threats to international peace and security through a transformation in the relations between States so that each State can feel secure from external military threats.

99. The concept of "defensive security" is related to the notion of common security, which implies that States recognize that their security is indivisible, i.e., that the security of every State within a given group or region is inseparably linked to that of others. These principles of common security are based on the Charter of the United Nations:

(a) All States have a legitimate right to security;

(b) Military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between States;

(c) Restraint is necessary in expressions of national policy.

The notion of common security also implies the two following conclusions:

(a) The pursuit of military superiority, as a factor of the arms race, is not a guarantee of security, and is obviously incompatible with the notion of common security;

(b) Reductions of armaments have to be pursued in the context of common security, which would ensure the necessary conditions for trust and stability.

100. To this end, it is necessary to promote awareness of the indivisibility of security of States through a concerted dialogue, the adoption of confidence-building measures, the gradual initiation of changes in military force postures and the reduction in the level of armaments.

101. It is important to stress that the achievement of "defensive security" requires in each case a specific attitude. The guiding principle is that a State achieves security by defending its own interests in a manner that does not reduce the security of others. To this end, practical political and military steps, which, once implemented, will reflect a commitment to the concept of "defensive security" have to be taken.

102. The principal objective of these political and military steps is to convey a commitment to the indivisibility of security by reassuring others of one's own peaceful intentions. The means furthering this objective are a respect for international law and a commitment to openness in political and military affairs. These considerations aim at reassuring other States that, in maintaining the ability to safeguard one's own security, one is at the same time committed to their security.

2. Political considerations

103. The most important political condition for "defensive security" is a commitment to adhere to the provisions enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and to act in accordance with international law. By definition, States that violate international law do not uphold the principles of "defensive security". To be credible, therefore, their declarations of intent regarding the lawful external behaviour of States must be followed by practical political and military steps to signal their intention to live by the principles of international law and uphold the Charter of the United Nations.

104. A major impediment to implementing "defensive security" is the existence of real or perceived conflicts of interest among States. A key political prerequisite therefore is to effect an improvement in the political relations among States and to seek a reduction in tensions, upholding international law and eliminating aggression.

105. The peaceful settlement of disputes would contribute to improving relations between adversaries. This requires an essentially political process. The settling of differences can be accomplished through a commitment to conflict resolution processes in accordance with international law. In keeping with its efforts to settle disputes in the world, the United Nations could play a useful role in this process.

106. An open political system, such as democracy, would better facilitate efforts to reduce mistrust than a closed political system. Although it does not constitute a guarantee for the absence of aggressive intentions, an open political system promotes open debate to challenge such intentions should they be promulgated as official policy. Sudden and unexpected shifts in policy will prove more difficult to implement. Furthermore, an open political system based on democratic principles provides an effective counter to the tendency of Governments to cloak their actions in secrecy. Since secrecy leads others to suspect motives and intentions, a political system that discourages secrecy in policy formation provides a basis for easing suspicions and fears.

107. It is also important that legitimate political authorities design and control defence policy. Military organizations require a certain degree of confidentiality and secrecy. However, in order to promote legitimate control, information regarding military matters must flow and be available to legitimate political authorities. Political control implies that the identification of threats and national interests, the development of strategic concepts, and decisions on weapons procurement should be the primary responsibility of a country's legitimate political authorities. The task of the military is to advise legitimate political authorities in these matters and to implement the latter's decisions in a way that is consistent with their instructions.

108. Political control also implies the promotion of civilian expertise in military affairs, both at the administrative and governmental levels and within the civilian society at large. This is particularly relevant in countries undergoing a transition from military rule to democracy. An open debate on defence and security issues involving experts from political parties and the civil society tends to give additional reassurance that Governments will not opt to pursue aggressive policies.

109. It should be stressed that openness is a relative concept. Its implementation, particularly in military affairs, requires a degree of reciprocity. In addition, the security situations facing States may also affect the degree to which States feel able to open up. In situations of acute conflict, even open political systems will tend to limit the degree of information that is freely available; closed societies will face few incentives to open up.

110. Democracy as such may not always be a guarantee that a State will not pursue offensive policies, and it certainly is no guarantee that other States might not perceive its policies as threatening or provocative. The mere enunciation of non-aggressive or peaceful intentions is no guarantee for security and stability, even if these intentions can be more easily gauged in an open society. While intentions may change in short order, military capabilities cannot. Hence, to be truly credible, reassuring and stabilizing, political pronouncements of defensive intentions should find their material expression in the manner in which armed forces are composed, trained, equipped, organized and deployed.

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3. Military considerations

111. Military considerations involve two factors: the strategic concept that prescribes the mission of armed forces and the force posture that provides the material capabilities for implementing the conceptual elements. In order to enhance the prospects for "defensive security" both the strategic concept and the force posture should emphasize "defensive" over "offensive" capabilities. 23/ Their validity depends upon reciprocity in their implementation, either bilaterally or multilaterally.

112. The military considerations described below apply in particular to bilateral situations in which States confront each other in an adversarial setting. Moreover, in the absence of political differences, States may not necessarily feel the need to adopt the force posture descriptions detailed here, since the fear of attack is absent. Additional factors, such as the inclusion of allies in the situation, and the specific problem posed by the role of some weapons systems, including weapons of mass destruction, are discussed in chapter IV.

(a) Strategic concepts

113. Carl von Clausewitz described defence in the following terms:

> "What is the concept of defence? The parrying of a blow. What is its characteristic feature? Awaiting the blow. It is this feature that turns any war into a defensive one; it is the only test by which defence can be distinguished from attack in war". 24/

Central to this description are the notions of space and time. Space refers to the area for defensive operations; time to the initiation of military action or reaction. Combined, the two elements define essential features of a defensive strategic concept.

114. A defensive strategic concept is one that is informed by the objective of protecting and preserving a particular space from attack. This space usually consists of a State's national territory or the territory of an ally. The objective of a defensive strategic concept in this regard is the protection of national or allied territory and the restoration of the *status quo ante* if its integrity should have been violated. It follows that the possession of a capability to seize and hold foreign territory is inconsistent with a condition of "defensive security".

115. The second critical element of a defensive strategic concept concerns time. A strategic concept that, besides continued efforts towards a peaceful settlement of conflict, concedes to others the initiative to resort to weapons, can be deemed defensive. Notions such as pre-emptive or preventive attack, would be incompatible with a defensive strategic concept. An emphasis on pre-emption would naturally be perceived as offensive by the other side, leading it to fear an attack and perhaps launch one before the other does. A defensive strategic concept therefore means that a State cannot initiate

combat operations unless its vital interests are violated. Any response, however, must be proportionate to the attack.

116. To be effective and credible in the eyes of a potential adversary, a defensive strategic concept must be reflected in the forces at one's disposal to support the objectives informing the strategic concept. As the earlier example regarding pre-emption demonstrates, mere statements that the objective is to defend one's territory and that one "intends to await an attack" are not credible if the forces deployed possess the capability for large-scale attack or aggressive action. Hence, a defensive strategic concept is most reassuring in its effect if it is reflected in the posture of the armed forces supporting it.

(b) Force postures

117. A strategic concept, properly understood, prescribes how armed forces as a whole should be organized, deployed, equipped and used. Its defensive orientation should therefore be reflected in the force posture as a whole and not necessarily in the individual capabilities and tactical considerations that make up the totality of strategic operations. The reason for this is clear once one considers the nature of military operations. At the operational and tactical levels of command (i.e., those at the Corps and Division level and below), considerations of offence and defence are but two sides of the same coin. As chapter IV will discuss in more detail, there are a number of reasons for this, of which two stand out. First, an effective defence requires offensive operations, if only to secure the return of territory that was lost as a result of the initial attack. Second, it is practically impossible to distinguish defensive from offensive intent if one examines particular weapon systems or individual military formations. Any weapon system can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes; any military formation, however equipped, is in principle capable of conducting offensive operations.

118. The difficulties in distinguishing between an offensive and a defensive orientation of ground forces is compounded in the case of naval forces because of the fundamental distinction that exists between war on land and war at sea. Whereas military actions on land tend to concentrate on the actual acquisition and occupation of territory or their denial, operations at sea are geared to securing unhampered access to and passage through international waters. In general, the oceans are used as means of communication - to conduct trade and commerce, to transport troops, supplies and equipment to zones of conflict and for other peaceful and non-peaceful purposes. With very few exceptions, the means for securing unhampered access to and passage through the sea can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes, i.e., either to deny access to others or to secure access for oneself. Because the notion of defensiveness generally refers to preserving territorial sovereignty, the notion is inherently difficult to apply to naval forces. Although still not easy in the case of ground forces, the defensive force posture considerations described below mainly refer to these forces.

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119. The orientation of a ground force posture should be assessed by examining the force posture as a whole. This means that one's attention should be directed primarily at the strategic level of command. There are at least four elements that provide some indication of the orientation of a given force posture. These are: the distribution within the entire force posture between those military capabilities that are necessary for invasion and large-scale offensive action and those that are not; the pattern of deployment of forces within the defended territory and the mobility of these forces; the state of readiness of military equipment and personnel; and the logistics and command and control capability necessary to sustain military operations. To promote "defensive security" it is necessary to reduce or minimize the offensive characteristics in each of these elements of a military force posture.

120. The defensive orientation of a force posture will be strengthened if the invasion capability is reduced. Central to this capability is the ability to generate sufficient thrust to enable the conduct of large-scale offensive operations. Strategic thrust is created by a combination of a high rate of mobility, firepower, technologically advanced weapons and the ability to sustain attack operations over large distances. Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft and attack helicopters are prime examples of forces capable of generating strategic thrust.

121. For example, a reduction in these weapon systems forms the core of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The goal of these reductions was to limit the relative capability of a group of States to generate the strategic thrust required to conduct large-scale offensive operations. However, unlike the concepts put forward by proponents of "non-offensive defence", the goal was not to eliminate these capabilities. It was clearly understood by the parties to the Treaty that offensive capabilities at the operational level remained necessary to meet defensive objectives, including to enable the recapture of lost territory and the rapid countering of attempts of a breakthrough.

122. Rather than seeking the complete elimination of those systems necessary for generating strategic thrust, force postures should convey an appropriate balance between military operations at lower levels of forces and armaments, as well as between offensive and defensive capabilities. Some capability for offensive operations at the tactical and operational level will remain necessary for an effective defence. But such a capability should be balanced with an increasing emphasis on those weapon systems (like anti-tank munitions, air defences and mines) that are necessary to counter offensive operations. It is the distribution between these capabilities that indicates the defensive or offensive orientation of a given force posture, not the absolute level of either. At the same time, as the CFE Treaty underscored, it is also necessary to ensure a reasonable balance of capabilities necessary for generating strategic thrust between two States or alliances.

123. A second issue relates to how forces are deployed. In order to launch an offensive, it is generally necessary to concentrate those ground forces that

possess a high degree of mobility and firepower along the critical axes of attack. Along with other features supporting an attack, such a capability can provide an indication of an offensive orientation. In order to convey a defensive orientation, forces deployed along the borders should be relatively stationary and inactive, with more mobile reinforcements placed in the rear. The relatively reduced mobility of forces deployed along the borders would act to reassure neighbours of a defensive orientation. Similarly, leaving the more mobile forces in the rear provides a potential adversary with warning in case these are moved towards the front before the onset of hostilities. At the same time, the reinforcements provide the necessary capability to counter any breakthrough attempts that cannot be met by the initial defending forces.

124. Another indication of an offensive orientation can in many cases be derived from a high degree of readiness in active and reserve forces. If the forces at or near the border are deployed in a high state of readiness, capable of rapidly conducting military operations not commensurate with the risk posed, then this could be one indication of an offensive orientation. If, in addition, reserves can be mobilized with deliberate speed so that the wartime strength of a State's armed forces can be quickly expanded, then this could provide a second indication. If, finally, there are active attempts to hide mobilization efforts from view, then there could be a high degree of likelihood that a premium is being placed on surprise, which is generally regarded as an indispensable element of offensive operations. However, speedy mobilization of reserves and surprise are equally features of a successful defence so that clear indications of a more offensive or defensive orientation may only be taken from a combination of different factors.

125. In general, the combination of a low state of readiness in the active forces (e.g., by relying only on partial manning of active units), a high degree of dependence on the mobilization of reserves (which are generally less well trained), and a commitment to openness and transparency of military preparations, including in particular of force movements and mobilization, can provide relatively clear indications of a defensive orientation of a State's force posture.

126. A final element that is crucial to identifying the orientation of a given force posture is the degree of logistical support that is available for sustained military operations. Of course, both the offence and the defence require logistical support to sustain operations until their respective objectives have been achieved. Therefore the size of the stockpile of military necessities - like ammunition, fuel and medical support - is not at issue. What distinguishes an offensive from a defensive orientation is the possession of a logistical organization that can sustain military operations at a distance from one's own territory for a substantial period of time. If there are large fuel and ammunition stocks stored well forward and a large capability for transporting them, then an offensive intention could be assumed. Conversely, a defensive orientation would be conveyed by a more stationary and withdrawn stockpiling of material support.

127. The recommendations on the level of training of forces, the use of

reserves and logistical support in defensive force postures could obviously not be applied as such in the case of States whose forces are solely composed of professional soldiers and, by definition, are maintained at a high state of readiness, or in the case of forces readily available for emergency missions (including collective security operations and operations to assist allies).

128. These force posture issues must also be reflected in the technological improvements, research and development practices and procurement efforts of a State. As far as new technologies are concerned, these should be directed at enhancing the defensive nature of the force posture, bearing in mind the difficulty of differentiating between them. Research, development, procurement and the transfer of additional weapon systems should be transparent to the extent possible and focus on bolstering defensive rather than offensive capabilities.

129. In sum, a military force posture could, in general, contribute to the aims of "defensive security" if: it is well balanced as to the capabilities necessary to seize and hold territory and those to defend against an attempt by others to do so; forward-stationed forces are lightly armed and less mobile while heavy armoured and mobile forces are deployed in the strategic rear without being vulnerable to pre-emption; active units are only partially manned and dependent upon the mobilization of reserves to be combat ready; military operations and the movement of forces are readily observable by others; and the logistical support of combat operations can be concentrated within the defended territory.

130. Confidence in the defensive orientation of armed forces designed in this manner will increase if the mission assigned to them and their actual involvement in conflicts over time clearly reflects this. Even if structured along defensive lines, military forces that are repeatedly assigned offensive missions will not be viewed as defensive. Hence, the mission assigned to forces and their practice over time should reflect the defensive orientation of strategic concepts and force postures.

IV. PROBLEMS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEFENSIVE SECURITY CONCEPTS AND POLICIES

131. The implementation of "defensive security" faces a number of practical problems. These include the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons and weapon systems; the requirement of any State to retain the ability to conduct counter-offensives at the tactical and operational level if it wishes to maintain the integrity of its territory; and the fact that the right to collective self-defence (whether enshrined in formal alliance commitments or not) implies the need for military capabilities that can be extended beyond the territory of particular States.

132. Over and above these practical problems, the progressive implementation of "defensive security" is made more difficult by a state of international relations in which tensions and conflicts persist. Although emphasizing the

defensive orientation of military capabilities can have beneficial effects on the nature of conflict situations by generating some confidence, the full implementation of the concept of "defensive security" ultimately depends on States feeling secure. An improvement in political relations and the creation of a sense of mutual trust among States is therefore a pre-condition for the successful implementation of "defensive security". Before analyzing practical measures for promoting such an improvement in relations, however, it is necessary to detail the practical problems confronting the implementation of defensive security concepts and policies.

A. Weapon systems

133. The characteristics of weapons and weapon systems pose two problems for the effective implementation of defensive security concepts and policies. First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make a distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons and weapon systems. Second, weapons of mass destruction pose a particular problem for the implementation of "defensive security". In the first case, and even to some extent in the second, it is only the context in which a weapon is used that will determine its defensive role. Yet, this context is by definition particular to specific circumstances, and the formulation of universally applicable guidelines is therefore impossible.

134. Much of the literature on "non-offensive defence" assumes that it is possible to make a clear distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons. Practical experience shows, however, that this assumption is misplaced, or at least requires qualification. Thus, anti-tank weapons can be used both to delay and destroy an advancing armoured attack or to dislodge a dug-in defence. Even the archetypical "offensive" and "defensive" weapons - the sword and shield - are ambiguous in their effect. Swords may be used to ward off offensive thrusts. Conversely, the effective use of a shield can disarm an opponent of his sword and can subsequently be employed to crush an opponent. It follows that the "offensive or defensive character of a weapon depends as much on the full context in which it is used as on its intrinsic properties. Even in chess, defensive or offensive games can be fought with the same sets of pieces". 25/

135. Although conventional weapons generally defy categorization in the absence of the context in which they might be used, this is different in the case of weapons of mass destruction. Despite a general failure during the Geneva World Disarmament Conference in the 1930s to identify clearly which weapons were offensive, there was agreement on which weapons should be considered as weapons of mass destruction. 26/ The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments adopted a resolution on 12 August 1948 by consensus, which declared "that weapons of mass destruction should be defined to include atomic explosives, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above". 27/

136. Although these weapons were not characterized as "offensive", weapons of mass destruction pose a severe challenge to a defensive orientation. There is widespread agreement within the world community on this point. The use in war of chemical and biological weapons is banned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In 1972, the biological and toxin weapons Convention banned the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons. In January 1989, 149 countries, meeting in Paris during the Conference of States Party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States, called for the early conclusion of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction under negotiation in Geneva (see A/44/58, annex). Hence, the international community is in agreement on the urgency of eliminating chemical and biological weapons. As such, their possession and use is inconsistent with the concept of "defensive security".

137. Nuclear weapons pose a somewhat different problem. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 recognizes that some States possess nuclear weapons and undertake to pursue "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (A/RES/2373 (XXII), annex, art. VI).

138. This goal was reiterated in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (the first such session completely devoted to disarmament), which was adopted by consensus on 30 June 1978:

> "It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons" (see resolution S-10/2, para. 47).

It also contained the following statement:

> "The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative, qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned" (ibid., para. 49).

139. These, as well as other statements, recognize that in the framework of efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament, which is a gradual process, further nuclear disarmament measures should be undertaken. In the East-West context, the arms race has already ended and has been reversed. In this regard, the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in July 1991, as well as the new Bush-Yeltsin agreement on strategic nuclear warheads of 17 June 1992 represent important steps. These and further reductions in other sectors of nuclear arsenals that have been announced must be implemented.

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B. Offensive versus counter-offensive capabilities

140. A second problem in implementing a defensive orientation in military policy is that an effective defence may require the ability to conduct offensive operations. At the tactical and operational level of war, this ability is therefore necessary for an effective defence. The most obvious reason for this is the defender's need to regain territory lost to the aggressor in the initial attack. But there are other imaginable situations in which offensive operations are critical to fulfilling defensive objectives. The Persian Gulf war provides one such example. In order to liberate Kuwait, coalition forces had to launch an offensive operation to dislodge occupying Iraqi forces. While the military operation was clearly offensive, its purpose - the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty - was precisely the kind of defensive objective deemed legitimate by the concept of "defensive security".

141. A force posture that would deprive the defence of the ability to conduct offensive operations at the tactical and operational level might therefore prove ineffective, thereby defeating the credibility of such a posture. The very mobility so often disdained as offensive by advocates of "non-offensive defence" is central to this ability. In certain situations, moreover, mobility might favour the defender over the attacker. For example, in the initial breakthrough battle the aggressor need not be highly mobile to effect surprise as long as movements can be concealed from the defender. On the other hand, the defender, caught by surprise, requires mobility to move forces rapidly to meet the attacker at the breakthrough point in order to secure objectives. 28/

142. If the force posture characteristics necessary for an effective counter-offensive capability are similar to those required for an offence, then it will be difficult to distinguish a defensive from an offensive orientation. This challenge to the implementation of "defensive security" can be mitigated by the adoption on a reciprocal basis of the force posture characteristics discussed in chapter III above. Thus, the distribution of mobile and stationary capabilities within the force posture could be such as to reduce the ability for large-scale offensive action; mobile forces that are in principle capable of offensive operations could be stationed well to the rear; the readiness of mobile units during peacetime could be held below wartime strength; and logistical support capabilities could be deployed away from the borders.

C. Collective defence and joint commitments by States

143. The concept of defensive military force postures that inheres in such notions as "non-offensive defence", generally assumes that the primary interest of all States is confined to the defence of national territory. In a general sense, this is of course true; under the Charter of the United Nations, the legitimate use of force is indeed confined to self-defence. In addition, Article 51 of the Charter also makes clear that States have the inherent right of collective self-defence, which in many cases may be the only

effective way in which the territorial integrity of States can be secured against the threat of, or actual, aggression.

144. The right of collective self-defence means that States must have the ability to come to the aid of victims of aggression. This may, in some cases, imply that at least some States, either individually or collectively, must possess the military means to project military power beyond their respective national borders. Such a capability by definition provides those States with a potential for an offensive action. In those cases the precept that States should possess only those armed forces that are sufficient for defending their own territory could pose a problem. In those situations, the possession and eventual use of such capabilities should be for the sole purpose of implementing collective self-defence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and consequently should not be perceived as posing a threat to neighbouring States.

145. Such situations can be found in formal alliance commitments between two or more States whether from the same region or not. In this respect, States have in the past sought, and are likely to continue to seek in the future, to protect their security by entering into formal military alliances for the purpose of collective defence. These alliances generally reflect - often with a sense of common values - a common threat perception to the interests of the members seeking security in the protection provided by a system of mutual assistance. The credibility of such protection depends, however, on the States being able to defend the interests of their allies. If the allies perceive this capability as a credible protection of their interests, then they may well themselves be prepared to adopt or maintain a purely defensive posture.

146. The security alliance between Japan and the United States offers an example of this situation. 29/ For historical as well as constitutional reasons, Japan has developed a military doctrine and force posture that is intended to be unambiguously defensive in nature. This "exclusively defense-oriented" policy is reflected in Japan's military forces: Japan does not possess long-range missiles, strategic bombers and aircraft carriers necessary for massive destruction of an adversary's territory; it will not possess, produce, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory; it will not engage its forces in combat operations outside its territory; and it will limit military operations to the immediate territory, sea and airspace of Japan. These precepts underscore that a defensive orientation can be expressed according to different criteria, which derive from specific circumstances.

147. However, Japan recognizes that its military capability might be insufficient in case of an attack on its territory and therefore relies on the United States to protect it from nuclear attack and to conduct any offensive operations necessary for the defence of its territory. The ability of Japan to adopt a defensive posture is therefore vitally dependent on the commitment by the United States to its defence should Japanese forces prove unable to defend Japanese interests.

148. Another example can be found in the mutual defence agreements between France and its allies in Africa. These agreements contain important provisions for mutual military assistance that are reinforced through bilateral and collective agreements. By virtue of France's protective military cover, some West African countries have been able to adopt defensive military postures and spend less on defence generally. As these examples demonstrate, the effectiveness of a truly defensive military force posture for some countries will depend on the offensive military capabilities of an ally. These agreements, however, have given rise to a moderate arms race within the regions concerned, especially by neighbours not party to the agreements.

149. An idea that has been proposed to address these difficulties is that of role specialization. Under this idea, which was not further explored by the Group of Experts and which might pose serious practical problems for its implementation, States in a given group would individually specialize in different force projection roles - for example, air-lift, sea-lift, logistical support, armoured warfare, deep strike capabilities, etc. Although no one State within such a group would possess an independent total force projection capability, the assembled forces of the group of States would be sufficient for collective operations beyond the borders of the States concerned. In this manner, role specialization may wherever feasible provide sufficient military capabilities for collective action without at the same time posing an actual or perceived threat to the security of other States.

D. Applicability at the bilateral, regional and global levels

150. Quite apart from these inherent difficulties of implementing a defensive orientation in military force postures, there are a number of practical obstacles to the implementation of the concept of "defensive security". One of these is that tensions or conflict between States or within a region might be so intense as to preclude adoption of defensive security policies by the States involved. Perceptions of insecurity that lead to the adoption of potentially offensive military postures are often the result of real differences of interest concerning territory, ideological predisposition or historical experiences, or differences in power. Given such perceptions, States are unlikely to embark on a course that reduces their military potential so long as there is no guarantee that their potential adversaries will follow suit.

151. Hence, in regions where conflict is rife, a political process designed to reduce differences of interest and degrees of mistrust is probably necessary to effect the necessary military changes. As discussed further in chapter V, this process could include confidence-building and transparency measures adopted on a reciprocal basis. The entire process of implementing defensive security policies in such regions may start either with the political or with the military elements or in concert. What is important is a commitment by all States in the region to begin the process and be aware that the political and military elements must be pursued in tandem.

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152. Disparities in power and size could also present a problem for the implementation of defensive security policies. Even if reduced and defensive in nature, the military force posture of a powerful country could pose a potential threat to a weaker neighbouring country. In these circumstances, the development and preservation of good political relations is the best guarantee for security.

153. Each of these challenges to the applicability of defensive security concepts and policies in specific bilateral and regional settings underscores the importance of political factors to the successful implementation of defensive security concepts. In the absence of a basic degree of mutual trust, mere changes in the disposition and capability of military forces will prove insufficient to effect the desired change. Of course, reducing the offensive or provocative character of military forces can be an important element in a strategy designed to improve political relations. However, in the absence of an active diplomatic involvement designed to solve real differences or alter misperceptions regarding external intentions, mere changes in military structures will prove insufficient.

V. STRATEGIES AND MEASURES TO PROMOTE "DEFENSIVE SECURITY"

154. The adoption of "defensive security" in international relations will be a gradual process. Its achievement requires a step-by-step approach that will differ from region to region, and from one bilateral or multilateral relation to another in its modalities and time-frame, although not necessarily in substance. In some regions, major progress has recently been achieved in transforming relations among States, and the possibility of achieving a system of cooperative security based on principles of "defensive security" is therefore clearly present. However, in many regions basic conflicts persist, although some rudimentary steps towards "defensive security" are being taken.

155. Because regional differences must be taken into account, there is not one, universally applicable strategy for promoting "defensive security" at the global level. At the same time, there are certain steps that are applicable in a more general sense, even though the specifics will differ from one region to the next. For example, the universality of the principles of collective security, as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, provides one basic component of a strategy for promoting "defensive security". Similarly, confidence- and security-building measures can reduce secrecy and suspicions and create the degree of mutual trust necessary to convince States to adopt more defensively oriented military postures. Constraints on military activities and limits on military equipment holdings also form indispensable components of a restructuring of a State's armed forces towards defensive postures. Finally, adequate and effective verification of observance of international obligations is necessary both to ensure compliance and to enhance mutual trust that States will continue to abide by these agreements.

156. Hence, a strategy for promoting "defensive security" will entail, in the first place, effective functioning of the collective security system embodied

in the Charter of the United Nations. In addition, such a strategy would include regional cooperative arrangements to enhance confidence that peace will be promoted and that aggression will be countered; the adoption of political and military measures designed to increase confidence between States - whether in a bilateral, multilateral, regional or global setting; and, finally, the negotiation of arms limitations and disarmament agreements that include adequate and effective verification measures, in order to instil confidence in new security arrangements.

157. The pace at which this strategy can be implemented and the scale of implementation will necessarily differ by region and from one bilateral relation to another. Moreover, since there is no one model that, when followed, guarantees the development of "defensive security", specific measures will have to be tailored to particular situations. Rather than providing a model, it is more useful and adequate to provide a choice of options from which States might select those measures they deem to be most appropriate for their specific circumstances.

A. Collective security, regional and other cooperative arrangements consistent with the Charter of the United Nations

158. Collective security, regional and other cooperative arrangements provide a real basis upon which States can feel secure. If States could rely on global, regional, or other arrangements to safeguard their security and interests, then they could adopt the military postures and strategic concepts that are compatible with "defensive security". In this regard, the collective security system embodied in the Charter of the United Nations has a critical role to play. The effective implementation of its provisions would reassure States that if their security and interests were threatened the international community would stand ready to come to their aid. Other collective security arrangements - be these bilateral, regional, or otherwise - may have similarly beneficial effects in reassuring their members. Finally, regional cooperative arrangements, designed to enhance economic, political and other forms of cooperation, may contribute to a sense of security and confidence conducive to the adoption of defensive security policies on the part of their members.

159. The effective implementation of the Charter of the United Nations - including a firm commitment by States to abide by the principle of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and the effective and consistent enforcement of Security Council resolutions - is a central element in promoting "defensive security". The experience of the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 has had an important effect in this regard. The imposition of sanctions, followed by an authorization to use all necessary means to ensure Iraqi compliance with the Security Council resolutions that addressed the crisis, and the resultant use of force to restore Kuwaiti sovereignty, demonstrated that cooperation among the Member States of the United Nations can provide the means necessary to restore international peace and security. The defeat of Iraq and the effective implementation of Security Council

resolution 687 (1991) further demonstrate that, if the United Nations takes a principled stance, aggression does not pay. As a result, States that intend to violate international law now face the possibility that concerted action on the part of the United Nations might render any aggression not only unsuccessful but also extremely costly.

160. Although the crisis in the Persian Gulf has demonstrated that the use of force may be necessary to enforce international law, this experience reinforces the importance of finding ways to prevent the need to resort to the enforcement provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. A more constructive involvement of the United Nations in terms of preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping and peacemaking within the framework and provisions of the Charter is called for. As elaborated in chapter II of the present study, the United Nations has in recent years intensified efforts in these and other areas, and this bodes well for its constructive involvement in the future. In so doing, the United Nations can strengthen the principles of collective security in a manner that reassures all States that their security will be provided for. On that basis, States may achieve the degree of confidence necessary to begin adopting measures designed to effect a defensive orientation in their military capabilities.

161. The United Nations Security Council addressed these and other issues when it met at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992. On that occasion, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to prepare an "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping". 30/ The Secretary-General responded to this invitation in his report, entitled "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping" (A/47/277-S/24111). The study suggests that the aim of the United Nations in this area must be:

(a) To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;

(b) Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;

(c) Through peace-keeping, to work to reserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;

(d) To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;

(e) And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression.

The study makes specific suggestions on how the United Nations might achieve these aims, several of which the Group of Experts found particularly relevant to "defensive security", especially those relating to preventive diplomacy.

162. That the effective functioning of a collective security system can produce gratifying results, including a willingness on the part of States to adopt policies consistent with the concept of "defensive security", is demonstrated by the effectiveness of collective security, regional and other cooperative arrangements. For example, in the postwar period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provided a collective security framework within which former enemies - including those who had fought a number of devastating wars - were reconciled to live together in peace.

163. The beneficial effects of regional efforts can also be seen in South-East Asia, Africa and Central America. Thus, the establishment of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 created a regional cooperative arrangement that first muted and eventually eliminated conflicts among the members themselves. 31/ Although political cooperation among the ASEAN States has generally been confined to dealing with external challenges, the fact of cooperation has proven to be a crucial confidence builder. It has promoted the development of common views and positions and encouraged mutual consultations to achieve common objectives, both of which have further stimulated interest in solving differences and neutralizing conflicts. As a result, there now exists a general expectation that disputes among the members will be resolved by peaceful means. It is this expectation that may enable the ASEAN countries to adopt defensive security policies.

164. In Africa, subregional groupings like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) have over time built confidence among their member States. ECOWAS, created in 1976, provides a particularly pertinent example. In 1981, economic harmonization and integration among the members was supplemented by a new defence protocol on mutual assistance. The protocol eschewed the use of military force in the resolution of disputes among the member States and pledged military assistance in case of need. Its usefulness was demonstrated in 1990, when monitoring troops from member countries were sent to Liberia to avert a total political collapse. The operation, better known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), became an inspiring model to the OAU. SADCC has played a constructive role in the southern African subregion. Since its founding in 1979, it has sought to promote various cooperative arrangements among its members. With the prospect for genuine democracy in South Africa and its eventual admission to SADCC, this subregional cooperative grouping is likely to play an even greater confidence-building role and help to erase mutual suspicions between South Africa and its neighbours. In turn, ECCAS has made further progress in developing confidence-building measures, disarmament and development in the subregion through the creation of a Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, with the assistance of the United Nations.

165. Similarly, in Central America the involvement of the Contadora nations provided the necessary framework for moving relations among the five Central American States involved in that process onto the path of mutual security. The reassuring effect provided by the involvement of neighbouring countries that were recognized to be genuinely impartial regarding disputes between and within the Central American countries enabled these countries to settle their disputes peacefully. As a result, while the provisions affecting the level and conduct of Central American military forces contained in the Contadora Act on Peace and Cooperation in Central America of June 1986 could not be implemented before a general settlement had been reached, now that such a settlement is well on its way to being achieved, the Central American countries can give serious consideration to adopting these military measures. The result will be a greater emphasis on the defensive nature of each State's military capabilities.

166. These examples demonstrate that collective security, regional and other cooperative arrangements provide a framework for countries to adopt measures that could help to promote "defensive security". These arrangements foster a climate conducive to negotiations, mediation and other means for solving disputes peacefully, thus establishing the basis for an emerging expectation that conflicts among States will be resolved by means short of the use of force. Once States are so reassured they may prove willing and able to reduce the role of military force in their relations and to adopt more defensive military postures.

167. The advantages of effective collective security and cooperative arrangements are generally well understood by States. Nevertheless, doubts about the ability of the United Nations, as well as of regional and other arrangements, to function effectively in all instances has led some States, particularly those in conflict-prone regions, to seek reassurance and protect their national security interests through a build-up in military forces. The continued acquisition of ever-increasing military forces may reduce the security of all States in the region by fostering suspicions and perceptions of aggressive intentions. The risks involved in such situations may be reduced through political efforts aiming at a reduction in tensions and threats in the region concerned, with a view to addressing the causes of conflicts.

B. Confidence- and security-building measures

168. Confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) seek to regulate military activities of States in order to prevent the use of armed force in international conflicts and to provide the basis for improving relations among States. CSBMs achieve this objective by erecting barriers to the use of force on the one hand and by enabling States to demonstrate their peaceful intentions on the other.

169. The importance of these measures was recognized by the United Nations Disarmament Commission when in 1988 it unanimously adopted "guidelines for

appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level". 32/ The same year, the General Assembly in its resolution 43/78 H endorsed the guidelines and recommended them "to all States for implementation, fully taking into account the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in a region, on the basis of initiatives and with the agreement of the States of the region concerned".

170. Confidence- and security-building measures designed to erect barriers to the use of armed force can be applied even in situations where the real sources of conflict have not yet been removed. Their goal is simply to contribute to the prevention of a war that neither side wants. Moving along a spectrum from peace to war, CSBMs can be designed to help achieve the following goals: inhibit the use of force for political intimidation; facilitate crisis management; establish a buffer to the outbreak of armed conflict; reduce the risk of surprise attack; create conditions that will favour the defence; and facilitate the termination of armed conflict. 33/

171. In addition to erecting barriers to the use of force, confidence- and security-building measures can also be designed to enable States to demonstrate their peaceful intentions. 34/ This second objective is achieved by reducing the degree of secrecy shrouding military activities. Secrecy contributes to uncertainty and rising tensions that may lead to war by miscalculation as a result of reciprocal fears of surprise attack or misjudging the intentions of adversarial States. In this regard, the goal of CSBMs is therefore to reduce secrecy regarding military activities. This can both reduce uncertainty and increase predictability and thereby reassure States that any military activity is routine and non-threatening in nature. The aim is to make military activity transparent in order to determine the "normal" peacetime uses of military forces. In this manner, any military activity will either be regarded as normal or, if it is not, provide an early indication that something is amiss.

172. Although there are numerous confidence- and security-building measures designed to achieve these objectives, each will fall into one of the following five categories: information measures, communication measures, access measures, notification measures and constraint measures. 35/ Not every measure will be applicable in all circumstances; different regional conditions will demand a diverse set of measures. Rather than specifying which measures might be most suitable in what context, a number of specific examples are provided below. Although the European experience provides the richest example of possible confidence- and security-building measures, there is also a substantial experience in other regional settings, including notably in the Middle East and also in Central America.

1. Information measures

173. Information measures consist of the exchange of data on military forces and activities. Their main purpose is to increase transparency and thus

reduce uncertainty regarding the military capabilities and dispositions of other States. There is of course the danger that the provision of incorrect information may feed a false sense of predictability. In this regard, data exchanges can serve the aim of deception rather than transparency. The ability to check the data is therefore important, which is why information measures are usually accompanied by access measures. However, even in the absence of cooperative verification measures - such as the mutual right to observe and/or inspect - information can be checked by national means in the same way that military capabilities are assessed without the exchange of information.

174. In 1992, the United Nations Disarmament Commission recognized the importance of information measures when it adopted "guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters". 36/ The guidelines, which set out principles and objectives of information measures in military matters, provide, inter alia, that "all States have the responsibility to provide objective information on military matters and the right of access to such information".

175. The principle of information exchange is now well developed in Europe. Even as part of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the thirty-five CSCE countries were required to give notification of military manoeuvres 21 days in advance, thus providing some degree of information regarding planned military activities. However, the provision of data regarding military capabilities is of more recent vintage. Not until the 1987 INF Treaty were the United States and the Soviet Union required to exchange data in regard to actual military capabilities. The earlier Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties had no provision for data exchanges and compliance was assessed only on the basis of data acquired by national technical means.

176. Provisions mandating the exchange of military information among the European States have expanded dramatically since the signing of INF Treaty. For example, every party to the 1992 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures must exchange the following information annually:

(a) The command organization of land and air forces (including air defence aviation and naval aviation permanently based on land) down to the brigade/regiment and wing/air regiment or equivalent level;

(b) For each formation or unit, the designated subordination, whether it is active or not, its normal peacetime location and the peacetime authorized personnel strength;

(c) The major organic weapon and equipment systems, specifying the numbers of each type, of: battle tanks, helicopters, armoured combat vehicles, anti-tank guided missile launchers mounted on armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, armoured vehicle launched bridges, combat aircraft and comprehensive technical data on all major weapon and equipment systems;

(d) Plans for the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems and the military budget for the forthcoming fiscal year.

The information to be provided under the CFE Treaty regarding equipment is also extensive.

177. The importance of information measures has been underscored by the attention given to it in recent regional arms control proposals. For example, under the draft Treaty on Central American Security put forward by Honduras in July 1991, the five Central American countries would annually exchange data on the composition of their armed forces, including on their organization, location, armaments, matériel and equipment (A/45/1038-S/22822). More generally, under its "Plan for Arms Control and Disarmament" announced on 3 June 1991, the Government of France stressed the importance of regional security initiatives focusing on confidence- and security-building measures. According to this plan, the "first requisite of confidence is information ... i.e., mutual information on the capabilities and condition of armed forces and troop movements". 37/

178. Information measures have also been proposed in the area of international arms transfers. In July 1991, the five permanent Members of the Security Council, meeting in Paris, voiced their "support for continued work in the United Nations on an arms transfers register to be established under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General". 38/ A study by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms, submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session (A/46/301), called for the establishment of a universal non-discriminatory arms transfer register under the auspices of the United Nations. According to the study, the register should be based on the following broad characteristics:

(a) The register should be so designed as to permit its prompt implementation;

(b) Participation in the register should be universal, including both arms suppliers and recipients;

(c) The parameters of the register should be such as to allow standardized and comparable input from all States;

(d) The register should be so designed and maintained as to provide meaningful information with regard to its purpose to build confidence, promote restraint in arms transfers on a unilateral, bilateral or multilateral basis to enhance security at lower levels of armaments, and allow timely identification of trends in arms transfers;

(e) The register set up should have a potential to expand to more comprehensive coverage, if required (see A/46/301, annex, para. 161).

179. On the basis of the study, as well as various proposals advanced outside the United Nations, the General Assembly discussed the question of transparency in international transfers of conventional arms at its forty-sixth session, in 1991. After thorough discussions, the Assembly took a decision which, in fact, represents a merger of different viewpoints that had emerged in the course of these considerations. In essence, it approaches the whole issue in a much broader manner by addressing not only arms transfers but also production. Thus the Assembly in its resolution 46/36 L requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the modalities for early expansion of the scope of the Register by the addition of further categories of equipment and inclusion of data on military holdings and procurement through national production. Furthermore, the Secretary-General will prepare a report in 1994 on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. In doing so, the Secretary-General will, inter alia, take into account the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which was requested in the same resolution to address "the question of the interrelated aspects of the excessive and destablizing accumulation of arms, including military holdings and procurement through national production, and to elaborate universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency in this field". In addition, the Conference on Disarmament was requested "to address the problems of, and the elaboration of practical means to increase openness and transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military applications and to weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with existing legal instruments". Accordingly, in May 1992 the Conference on Disarmament decided to inscribe a new item on transparency in armaments on its 1992 agenda.

180. Information measures can also involve data relating to weapons of mass destruction. For example, States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, have agreed to exchange, on a voluntary basis, information on biological activities, including on past research and development programmes and on vaccine production facilities. As part of their agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities, India and Pakistan exchanged information on the location of these facilities on 1 January 1992. In addition, in his report on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, the Secretary-General proposed, inter alia, that States in the Middle East unilaterally declare their activities in the nuclear field that are not covered by the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. These could include uranium mining or processing, heavy water or tritium production or stockpiling, and any research facilities capable of handling even de minimis quantities of fissionable material that are exempted under standard safeguards agreements. In addition, a large number of States have announced their commitment to become original signatories to the chemical weapons convention once this has been completed. The September 1989 memorandum of understanding regarding chemical weapons signed by the United States and the Soviet Union is another significant information measure. It provides, inter alia, for an exchange of data on the location, composition and size of their respective chemical weapons stockpile.

2. Communication measures

181. Communication measures are among the oldest forms of formal confidence- and security-building measures, dating back at least until the 1963 "Hot-Line" Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their purpose is to provide a forum to discuss differences and reach a greater understanding of mutual intentions. By engaging in dialogue, differences between States can be ironed out, misunderstandings avoided, and transparency enhanced. The actual process of negotiations between States - whether concerned with the resolution of conflicts or the formulation of arms control measures - is therefore an important confidence builder. These processes consist of a dialogue between States, through which perceptions regarding respective intentions might be changed, interests redefined, and mutual concerns better understood. A willingness to engage in a negotiating process therefore represents a first useful step along the road to building mutual trust.

182. In addition to the process of negotiations, there are a number of more specific examples of successful communication measures. These include: the provision for liaisons to be included in observations and inspections resulting from the Israeli-Egyptian agreements regarding the Sinai; the establishment by CSCE of the Conflict Prevention Centre; and the Seminars on Military Doctrine held under the auspices of CSCE.

183. Perhaps the most striking example of a successful communication measure (when combined with other measures) was the provision under the Israeli-Egyptian Separation of Forces Agreement of January 1974 that Israeli and Egyptian liaison officers would participate in the verification activities of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was established to oversee the implementation of the agreement. 39/ This provision contributed to the development of confidence between the two States, who at the time were still in a formal state of war. Under the 1975 Interim Agreement, the degree of cooperation was extended through the creation, under the auspices of the United Nations, of a joint Israeli-Egyptian committee tasked with monitoring the implementation of the agreement, solving problems and misunderstandings on the spot and serving as a liaison for both countries to UNEF and the United States Sinai Support Mission.

184. This experience formed the basis of the even more extensive joint verification provisions of the 1979 Peace Agreement. Under this agreement, the liaison system established by the Interim Agreement was expanded to include not only monitoring of the agreement's execution in cooperation with the Multinational Force and Observers, but also direct responsibility for solving problems and preventing crisis situations that might emerge because of errors or misunderstandings. There are liaison offices in El-Arish and Beersheba, each headed by senior military officers. Difficulties that cannot be solved at this level are addressed by a joint committee, headed by generals, which meets biannually or at the request of one of the parties. The success of these efforts is demonstrated by the absence of major non-compliance controversies and a general agreement that each side is abiding by the terms of the agreement. The net result is a communication measure that

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has contributed to building confidence between two States that had fought four major wars within a quarter of a century.

185. Two communication measures were also agreed upon during the Paris CSCE summit meeting in November 1990. One concerned the establishment of direct communication between the capitals of the participating States for the transmission of messages relating to agreed measures contained in the Vienna Document and also, as decided in June 1991, in case of emergency situations. Another consisted of the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Centre. One of the Centre's functions is to address "unusual and unscheduled military activities" about which a participating State expresses its security concern. In case such an activity occurs and if the State responsible for that activity fails to satisfy the concerns of another State, the latter can call a meeting of the Consultative Committee of the Centre to discuss the issue. The Conflict Prevention Centre therefore provides a forum for consultation and possible cooperation to resolve the issue in question in a mutually satisfactory way.

186. An important contemporary example of a communication measure is the Military Doctrine Seminar held under CSCE auspices. The first such seminar was held for three weeks in January 1990, with a second one held in October 1991. The format of both sessions consisted of an introductory explanation of each participant's military doctrine, as well as discussions on force posture, training and exercises and budgets. The latter three topics provided the participants the opportunity to demonstrate how their military doctrine was reflected in the structure and training of, and spending for, their military forces.

187. Held soon after the revolutionary events of 1989, the first Seminar on Military Doctrine was attended by European and North American participants represented at the highest level. The seminar provided not only a unique opportunity for participants to meet and have personal contacts, but also to inquire about the nature and extent of change in the military doctrines announced by the Eastern European countries. Similarly, the then-members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization used the opportunity to question NATO countries regarding their doctrine of forward defence and their emphasis on the concept of follow-on forces attack (FOFA), which many regarded as being offensive in nature. The result was that many of the NATO countries gained a clearer picture of, and confidence in, the military changes that were then under way in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the NATO members gained a better understanding of why the FOFA concept could have represented a concern to Eastern Europe.

188. The second Military Doctrine Seminar, held in October 1991, followed the same pattern as the first one. Taking place just before the NATO Summit in Rome, and with the situation in the Soviet Union so much in flux, the seminar did not break new ground. However, the absence of controversy was considered a good sign, providing further evidence of a new cooperative spirit replacing the confrontational habits of the past. The seminar identified some issues which could be jointly explored further at shorter, though more frequent, seminar meetings. These included: the criteria for conventional stability;

the characteristics of defensive and offensive armed forces; the degree of operational flexibility and mobility of crisis response and counter-attack capabilities that one would concede to the other side without feeling threatened strategically; the necessary constraints for the sake of mutual confidence; exercise patterns; and transparency requirements, not least with regard to mobilization. Such an approach would avoid the pitfall of discussions on the offensive or defensive nature of strategic concepts, since pledges of non-aggression or reasonable sufficiency offer no adequate assurances for security and stability. Thus the assumption here is that the defensive character of a security concept and corresponding policies must be underlined by the defensive orientation of its military-strategic postures, affecting the operational, strategic and tactical levels of armed forces.

189. In short, discussions regarding strategic concepts among military officials in different countries can play a useful confidence-building role between States. A willingness to provide information, to engage in a far-reaching discussion of military matters and to explain military deployments, equipment levels and training capabilities is the most direct route to reducing secrecy, uncertainty and misperceptions. Of course, as the European experience shows, political relations must reach a certain stage to make a military dialogue fruitful. If suspicions and fears dominate the proceedings, then the dialogue might turn into an exercise of mutual propaganda or even of disinformation. However, once a certain degree of mutual trust has been established, a wide-ranging military dialogue can do more to enhance confidence than many other measures.

3. Access measures

190. Access measures provide a means to check both the accuracy of data exchanged under various information measures and the validity of statements provided as part of communication measures. As noted above, deceptive information and statements can create a false sense of security; access provides a means to verify their accuracy. In addition, providing access enhances the goal of all confidence- and security-building measures to break down the barriers of secrecy surrounding military activity and to enhance the transparency of military operations and capabilities. Examples of access measures include observations of military exercises, on-site inspections of military activities and force limitations, and open skies regimes.

191. European confidence- and security-building measures included observations as early as the Helsinki Final Act, under which parties, then still on a purely voluntary basis, could invite others to observe notifiable military activities. The discretionary nature of this access measure, however, reduced its value as a means to create openness, although it did enable States to reassure their neighbours through the issuance of invitations. This provision was strengthened in the 1986 Stockholm Document negotiated as part of the CSCE process and further developed in the Vienna Document 1992. Under the latter's provisions, a mandatory invitation for observations by other participating countries must be issued for any exercise involving 13,000 or more troops

(3,500 if the exercise involves an amphibious landing or a parachute assault by airborne forces). A similar requirement is contained in the Honduran draft Treaty on Central American Security, where invitations for observations must be issued for each notifiable military activity.

192. A more intrusive access measure involves on-site and aerial inspections. In Europe, it was not until the conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that agreement on the right to inspect notifiable military activities on short notice was first achieved. Under the provisions of the Vienna Document 1992, each participating State must accept up to three inspections annually of a specified area in which a notifiable military activity is or is suspected of taking place. These inspections can be conducted on land or from the air. Far more intrusive forms of inspections are included in major arms limitation agreements like the INF, CFE and START Treaties.

193. The right to on-site inspections is not unique to European agreements. In the Middle East, inspection provisions are a crucial part of the various agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. Thus, under the Israeli-Syrian Separation of Forces Agreement of 1974, the United Nations Disengagement Observation Force (UNDOF) is responsible for routine and challenge on-site inspection, as well as for general monitoring of the agreement. Routine inspections are to take place no less than once every 15 days and involve the verification of limits on military forces, equipment and weapons systems within each side's restricted separation zone. Upon the request of either party, UNDOF can also carry out challenge inspections. In all cases, the findings must be reported to both sides. Although actual access is denied to the parties involved, the inspection role performed by United Nations forces helps to create confidence that both sides will abide by an agreement that has been in force for over 18 years. On the other hand, the absence of a liaison system and the requirement that the United Nations mandate for supervising the agreement be renewed every six months provide a much weaker basis for confidence building than in the Israeli-Egyptian agreements.

194. As noted above, Israeli and Egyptian liaison officers participated in the inspection activities conducted by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) under the Israeli-Egyptian Separation of Forces Agreement. This access was expanded under the Interim Agreement, with both sides allowed to conduct overflights up to the buffer zone. In addition, they could use reconnaissance aircraft up to the middle of the buffer zone, using two aircraft up to seven times per week flying at an altitude no lower than 4,750 metres. Finally, both sides operated an early-warning station on each side of the Giddi Pass, which were manned by up to 250 persons using visual and electronic surveillance systems. In accordance with the Agreement, the deployment of offensive weapons at the stations was banned. As noted, inspection provisions under the Peace Agreement were even more extensive.

195. A final example of an access measure was first proposed by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower during the July 1958 Geneva summit. This was

the idea of a United States-Soviet "Open Skies" regime under which each side could conduct aerial photography missions throughout the territory of the other. Revived by President George Bush in May 1989, an Open Skies Treaty was signed by 24 CSCE member States in March 1992. The Treaty will be open to signature to all other CSCE participating States. Hungary and Romania had earlier signed an agreement allowing reciprocal overflights of each other's territory.

196. Agreement to conduct aerial overflights of the territory of other States grants a large degree of access that can be used to confirm the absence of threatening military activities, compliance with agreed measures and force limitations, and a more general willingness to open up a society to outside inspection for the purpose of demonstrating peaceful intentions and good will. In extending the degree of transparency, open skies regimes provide an added measure of reassurance and predictability upon which to base an increase in confidence in the relations between States.

4. Notification measures

197. Notification measures are designed to enhance predictability by requiring States to inform each other of an impending military activity. These measures therefore permit such activities to take place, but ensure that their conduct will take no one by surprise. Implicitly, moreover, the requirement of advanced notification enjoins States not to undertake certain military activities that have not been notified. Examples of notification measures that are currently in effect include ballistic missile launches, the conduct of military exercises and the movement of forces and equipment. Each measure attempts to eliminate surprise in the conduct of specific military activities by notifying others that the activity will take place. As a result, predictability is enhanced.

198. Under the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the Soviet Union and the United States, both countries were required to notify each other in advance of any planned missile launches if these would extend beyond national territory in the direction of the other country. Such notification therefore eliminated concern on the part of both countries that a ballistic missile launched in their direction was the start of an attack. The 1971 Agreement was extended in 1988, when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to notify each other at least 24 hours in advance of the planned date, launch area and area of impact of any strategic ballistic missile launch, no matter what its direction or impact area. This agreement again helps to reassure both sides that a missile launch does not represent an impending attack.

199. In the area of conventional forces, advance notification of military activities has generally involved military manoeuvres and the movement of forces or equipment. Extensive provisions for advance notification were, for example, included in the Helsinki, Stockholm, and Vienna agreements. Under the Helsinki Final Acton Confidence-Building Measures, States were required to

notify each other 21 days in advance of major military manoeuvres involving 25,000 or more troops and were encouraged to notify each other in the case of other manoeuvres and major military movements. Some of the ambiguity of the language and the discretionary nature of some of the measures in the Helsinki Final Act were eliminated in the Stockholm and Vienna documents. Under these agreements, the following military activities are subject to prior notification (with lead time required for each notification indicated in parentheses):

(a) Major military activities, "concentrations" or transfers of forces involving at least 9,000 troops or 250 tanks (42 days);

(b) Amphibious landings or parachute drops involving at least 3,000 troops (42 days);

(c) Large-scale activities involving more than 40,000 troops (2 years).

200. The draft Treaty on Central American Security (A/45/1038-S/22822, annex) put forward by Honduras also contains extensive provisions concerning notifiable military activity. Specifically, the draft treaty calls upon the parties to notify 30 days in advance military activities if: they take place within 30 kilometres of the border of another State party; foreign forces are involved; more than 1,000 personnel or 100 naval personnel participate; more than 300 paratroops are dropped; or if 20 or more airplane and/or helicopter sorties are involved.

5. Constraint measures

201. The final set of confidence- and security-building measures, unlike the previous four, actually prohibits specific military activities. In being more intrusive and actually limiting operations, as opposed to merely subjecting them to prior notification or observation, constraint measures are inherently more difficult to negotiate than other measures. It is therefore not surprising that, with the exception of one specific type of constraint, few of these measures have thus far been negotiated. The exception concerns disengagement zones which have existed since the mid-1970s in the Middle East. Other constraint measures limit the size, frequency and/or duration of military exercises.

202. As part of the framework for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) suggested the establishment of disengagement zones between Israel and its Arab neighbours. It took another war in 1973 to bring these proposals to fruition. As part of the Israeli-Syrian Separation of Forces Agreement, zones were established on both sides of the lines of separation on the Golan Heights in which Israeli and Syrian forces were limited to specific ceilings within two zones extending 20 kilometres east and west of the lines of separation. Although the details remain confidential, limits within these zones apply both to manpower and to certain types of weapons (including tanks, artillery and surface-to-air missiles) that can be used for offensive purposes.

203. More detailed information is available regarding the disengagement zones established in the Sinai agreements of 1974 and 1975. Under the Israeli-Egyptian Separation of Forces Agreement, each side was limited to 30 tanks and 7,000 troops within their respective areas of limited armaments and forces. Additionally, the following were prohibited: artillery with ranges in excess of 12 kilometres; weapons that could interfere with the other party's flights over its own forces; fixed installations for missile sites; surface-to-air missiles; and weapons that could reach the other party's separation line. These limits were extended in the Interim Agreement where, within their limited-forces zones, both sides were permitted to deploy no more than 8,000 troops, 75 tanks and 72 artillery pieces with ranges not to exceed 12 kilometres. 40/

204. The Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements represented the first time that the deployment of weapons considered to be offensive in nature were limited in specific zones. Combined with extensive verification measures under third-party auspices, the successful operation of these disengagement provisions has the effect of extending the warning time available to both sides in case of an impending attack. In addition, by creating a buffer between the two sides, the risk of miscalculation and accidental war is reduced. In this manner, predictability is enhanced, providing the basis for building confidence between adversarial States.

205. However, the practical military utility of disengagement zones should not be overstated. Given their limited nature, the reintroduction of offensive capabilities in case of a crisis can generally take place in a matter of hours. Proposals for establishing such disengagement zones in Europe put forward during the height of the cold war (for instance, the Gromyko, Rapacki and Kennan Plans) were therefore rejected. More recently, however, as political relations have improved, the idea of establishing disengagement zones has garnered increasing interest in Europe. The idea behind these proposals is less to separate warring parties (as was the case in the Middle East) than to reinforce and demonstrate peaceful intentions. This confidence-building aspect of disengagement zones was the stated reason for Hungary's proposal in November 1989 to create a "zone of confidence" in the Alpe-Adriatic region, which would have banned offensive military forces within 50 kilometres of the common borders of Hungary, Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. A similar reasoning accompanied the proposal put forward by Greece in July 1991 to limit weapons such as tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, fighter planes and assault helicopters from the regions where the Greek, Turkish and Bulgarian borders meet. An agreement along these lines was signed by Bulgaria and Greece in December 1991.

206. A second constraint measure concerns limits on the size, frequency and/or duration of military activities, such as exercises and movement of forces. To date, the only existing such constraint in Europe affects the following types of military activities:

(a) No more than one military activity involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 tanks every two years;

(b) No more than six military activities involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks every year;

(c) Of the latter, no more than three military activities involving more than 25,000 troops or 400 battle tanks every year.

6. Lessons from recent experiences

207. Although the nature of the confidence-building regimes that were constructed in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere differed in their specifics, these experiences may provide useful lessons for other regions where efforts to build confidence have yet to begin. Rather than suggesting specific measures that States might wish to negotiate, these lessons provide useful guidelines for the development of a confidence-building regime in other parts of the world.

208. The first lesson is that while there are a host of conceivable confidence- and security-building measures, negotiating agreements on specific measures will take time. The elimination of conflict and the building of confidence (let alone security) between States is a gradual process that requires a just treatment of the case and time to achieve its intended effect. To overcome historical animosities, reduce conflicts of interest to a more manageable level, correct misperceptions clouding decision-making processes and diminish mistrust in relations between States all takes time. It took the 35 CSCE States 11 years to move from agreement on largely discretionary measures to a more robust confidence-building regime. It took another four years for the main antagonists to agree to actual force reductions. In the Middle East, Israel and Egypt proved able to build an extensive regime in five years, but Israel and Syria have yet to move beyond their initial efforts of 1974. In Central America, the basis of an ambitious plan like that contained in the 1986 Contadora Act or the more recent Honduran draft Treaty is only now being laid. In short, confidence cannot be built overnight; it is, of necessity, a gradual and painstaking process.

209. A second lesson of recent experiences is that the building of confidence between States can be further enhanced if secrecy surrounding military activities is reduced. An excess of secrecy contributes to mistrust, misperceptions and misunderstandings in the relations between States, all of which encourages them to plan on the basis of worst-case assumptions. Transparency is therefore the crucial basis for building confidence. The key to transparency is information exchange and the means to check its accuracy. Confidence building must therefore start with information and communication measures, accompanied by access measures.

210. Notification of planned military activities creates a degree of predictability in the peacetime operations of military forces. An intensive dialogue, first at the political and then at the military level, provides States with the opportunity to explain their intentions and forces them to justify their military activities in a reassuring manner. A far-reaching and

thorough dialogue on military matters also compels States to put themselves in each other's place in order to see how their own actions might be perceived by others. As mutual understanding grows and defensive intentions become more clearly apparent, States can move on to negotiating measures that will actually constrain or prohibit certain military activities, in the belief that such activities are both unnecessary to meet legitimate defensive objectives and might be perceived as threatening to others.

211. A third lesson is specific to regions in which conflict is rife and tensions are high. In such regions, an effective confidence-building process may, in certain situations, benefit from third-party participation. The involvement of third parties that are regarded as impartial by all sides in the conflict is often necessary to get negotiations going. A third party may be a country, group of countries, a regional organization, or the United Nations.

212. A final lesson that can be learned from recent experiences is that States must first gain confidence regarding the defensive orientation of military force postures before they are willing to engage in actual reductions of military capabilities that are part of these postures. Once the force postures have become transparent and States have been able to gain a sufficient degree of confidence that the forces as a whole are organized largely for defensive purposes, they may be willing to engage in a process leading to actual reductions in military equipment holdings. In many cases, agreement on force reductions cannot therefore precede the effective implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. Once secrecy has been reduced through greater transparency, predictability concerning the peacetime activity of military forces has been enhanced and a certain degree of mutual confidence between States has been built, States may be willing to engage in the difficult process of arms limitation and disarmament.

C. Arms limitation and disarmament

213. In contrast to confidence- and security-building measures, arms limitation and disarmament agreements are designed to affect the structure of opposing military forces through limitations and/or reductions in actual military capabilities. Once a sufficient degree of mutual trust has been established or a modicum of common interest has been identified, States may decide that their security is best served by placing mutual restrictions on their forces. In this manner, the traditional goals of arms control - to reduce the probability of war, the extent of damage in case of war and the cost of maintaining military forces - can be achieved.

214. In addition, arms limitation and disarmament agreements can contribute directly to "defensive security". Depending on the details, the defensive orientation of military forces can be enhanced by agreements that limit, balance or reduce particular "offensive" aspects of their capabilities. As regards weapons of mass destruction, which should ultimately be eliminated, any agreed reduction in these weapons should in principle promote "defensive

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security". Conventional arms limitation and disarmament agreements can also promote "defensive security", provided that particular attention is paid both to the weapons and weapons systems affected by the agreement and the manner in which these are to be limited or reduced. Unlike the case of weapons of mass destruction, certain conventional force limitations or reductions may reduce rather than enhance the defensive orientation of the military forces concerned. Therefore, in order to promote "defensive security", specific elements of conventional arms limitation and disarmament agreements should be taken into account. For these reasons, moreover, agreements affecting weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons must be clearly distinguished.

1. Weapons of mass destruction

215. In a world in which "defensive security" is fully achieved, weapons of mass destruction would have been eliminated. This, indeed, should remain the objective of all States. However, a transition from the present to such a world is likely to be a long process, during which time at least some States will continue to possess some weapons of mass destruction. Arms limitation and disarmament are part of a process by which all these weapons will be further reduced and finally eliminated. This may prove easier in some categories of weapons (e.g., biological weapons, which have been banned) than in others (e.g., nuclear weapons), as well as in some regions than in others.

216. Under the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, the signatories agreed not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire "microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protection or other peaceful purposes" and "weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict" (resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex, art. I). To date, 120 States are party to the Convention.

217. The Biological Weapons Convention is the first global disarmament agreement ever concluded and, as such, represented a highly significant step towards the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. As a result of the revolution in biotechnology, compliance concerns on the part of some States parties, and the reported interest in biological weapons of some non-signatory States, efforts have been made in recent years to strengthen the Convention. For example, at the Second Review Conference of parties to the Convention, in 1986, it was agreed that consultative meetings to review compliance concerns should be promptly convened to consider problems, suggest ways to clarify ambiguities, or initiate procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. Finally, in an effort to build confidence in the Convention, States parties participating in the Conference agreed to exchange information concerning biological activities directly related to the Convention. 41/

218. Five years later, at the Third Review Conference, in September 1991, States parties agreed, *inter alia*, not only to strengthen the existing

measures, but also to add three new confidence-building measures, most notably regarding the declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research development programmes and of vaccine production facilities. The Conference also decided to establish an ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint on the basis of a number of criteria agreed upon by States parties at the Review Conference. 42/

219. Only one multilateral agreement currently governs chemical weapons. The 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases as well as bacteriological methods of warfare. Since 1980, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has been negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. At the Conference of States Party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States held in Paris in January 1989, 149 countries stressed the importance of concluding a chemical weapons convention and called upon all States to become original parties to the convention as soon as it was concluded.

220. The negotiations in Geneva have now entered their final stages. The 1992 mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament aims at achieving a final agreement on a chemical weapons convention during 1992. Under the convention, the parties would agree to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The convention would also include provisions relating to: assistance and protection against chemical weapons; economic and technological development; and measures to redress a situation to ensure compliance, including sanctions.

221. In anticipation of, and as a complement to, the conclusion of the Geneva negotiations on a chemical weapons convention, a number of States have proposed bilateral and regional limitations on chemical weapons (as well as other weapons of mass destruction). An important step in this regard was the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (since reaffirmed by Russia) to destroy the bulk of their large chemical weapon stockpiles and to cease production of chemical weapons. Under the agreement, which was signed in June 1990, though it is not yet in force, both sides pledged to reduce their stockpiles to 5,000 agent tons by the year 2002, a reduction of between 80 and 90 per cent of each country's inventory.

222. In the same spirit, regional agreements prohibiting chemical weapons have also been proposed in recent years. These efforts have been concentrated primarily in Latin America and the Middle East. For example, in September 1991, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, joined subsequently by Uruguay, and then by Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay, signed the Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Mendoza Accord) in which they declared "their full commitment not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain, transfer directly or indirectly, or use chemical or biological weapons" (A/46/463, annex, para. 1). Later that year, Bolivia,

Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela signed the Cartagena Declaration on the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, in which they expressed their commitment "to renounce the possession, production, development, use, testing and transfer of all weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, bacteriological (biological), toxin or chemical, and to refrain, under any circumstances, from stockpiling, acquiring or retaining such categories of weapons" (A/46/760, annex, para. 2). Finally, the draft Treaty on Central American Security put forward by Honduras in July 1991 stipulated that the five Central American countries should agree not to acquire, maintain, or station on their territory chemical, radiological and bacteriological weapons.

223. In the Middle East, the idea of eliminating weapons of mass destruction goes back to at least 1974, when Iran, later joined by Egypt, first proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Since that time, the United Nations General Assembly has consistently called, in resolutions on the subject, for "practical and urgent steps required for implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East". 43/ Since 1980, these resolutions have been adopted without a vote.

224. In recent years, with the reported proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in the region, proposals have been made to free the Middle East of other weapons of mass destruction. For example, in January 1989, Israel proposed the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. 44/ In April 1990, Egypt proposed the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. 45/ This proposal has been endorsed by a wide range of States, regional and other organizations and by the Security Council in resolution 687 (1991). The resolution stressed that actions to disarm Iraq regarding its nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles for their delivery should be regarded as "steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons". The importance of this goal was further stressed by the United States in President Bush's arms control proposal for the Middle East of May 1991 and by France in its June 1991 "Plan for Arms Control and Disarmament", which also emphasized that the goal of regional zones free of weapons of mass destruction should be pursued in other parts of the world as well.

225. A strengthened bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons convention and the rapid conclusion of a chemical weapons convention (both of which now seem to be within reach) represent crucial steps towards the promotion of "defensive security". These conventions will reaffirm an international norm, first included in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, that the use (and now the possession) of chemical and biological weapons represents a breach of international peace and security.

226. As regards nuclear weapons, important developments have taken place in recent years. Considerable progress has been achieved in nuclear disarmament and the policy of reducing nuclear arsenals is actively pursued. Starting

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with the INF Treaty of 1987, which banned United States and Soviet intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles, the nuclear Powers have embarked on a concerted effort to limit and reduce their respective stockpiles. In June 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a verification protocol for the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties, enabling their ratification and entry into force later that year. During the Moscow summit in July 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the START Treaty reducing their strategic offensive forces by about 30 per cent. In September and October 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union respectively announced sweeping unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons based on land and at sea and other changes in strategic nuclear forces, as described in chapter II above. Also in October 1991, NATO endorsed an 80 per cent reduction in its substrategic nuclear weapons. Finally, in June 1992, President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin agreed to reduce United States and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by 70 per cent from current levels.

227. These facts demonstrate that we are well on the way towards halting and reversing the arms race. However, serious problems still exist, including the continued presence of large numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of some States, the continuance of nuclear-weapon tests by some States and problems relating to the proliferation of such weapons, both vertically and horizontally. Consequently nuclear disarmament should continue to be pursued with increasing resolve. Within the framework of general and complete disarmament, an objective which shall need a long transitional period, the nuclear-weapon States should undertake further substantial reduction of their nuclear-weapon stockpiles, as a step towards their total elimination.

228. The possession of weapons of mass destruction poses a specific problem as regards the achievement of a system of international relations based on the concept of "defensive security". In recent years, however, the prospect of limiting and eventually eliminating these weapons by agreement and with effective international controls has markedly improved. This trend bodes well for the promotion of "defensive security" in the years ahead.

2. Conventional weapons

229. Conventional weapon systems are legitimate instruments for preserving the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. The central problem is therefore how to limit such forces without undermining the ability of States to meet their legitimate defensive needs.

230. There is no universally applicable model for conventional arms limitations that guarantees sufficient defensive capabilities but eliminates offensive capabilities *in toto*. Accordingly, conventional arms limitations will have to be agreed to as part of a more general strategy to promote the idea of "defensive security". To this end, limitations on conventional arms should be pursued in parallel with confidence- and security-building measures and the strengthening of collective security arrangements.

231. Conventional arms limitations designed to enhance the defensive orientation of military capabilities should contain at least three elements. First, the ability to generate strategic thrust through a combination of high mobility and concentrated firepower should be reduced in a balanced fashion. Secondly, forces capable of destroying targets deep in an opponent's territory should be adequately curtailed. Finally, the readiness and sustainability of conventional military formations should be limited commensurate with defensive requirements. In each of these cases, it is important to ensure that capabilities are reduced on a reciprocal, equitable and balanced basis within a given region or subregion.

232. Conventional arms limitations should focus on reducing those capabilities that provide armed forces with the ability to generate the thrust necessary for large-scale, strategic offensive operations and surprise attack. These capabilities consist of those weapon systems that combine a high rate of mobility with the ability to concentrate firepower. In the naval area, these include long-range naval guns and missiles, carrier-borne aircraft, and attack submarines. In the land forces area, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces (including mortars and multiple rocket launchers) and combat helicopters and aircraft fall in this category. Not surprisingly, the November 1990 CFE Treaty places strict limits on each of these five categories of ground-combat armaments. These weapons were limited because tanks and armoured vehicles form the core of the ability to seize and hold territory; artillery provide for direct fire support; and helicopters and aircraft combine firepower and high mobility into single weapon systems.

233. The CFE Treaty limits these categories to equal levels for both sides (consisting of the Group of Sixteen composed of the NATO countries and the Group of Thirteen composed of former Warsaw Treaty countries). 46/ In addition, the Treaty provides for a "sufficiency rule", under which no one country is allowed to possess more than a certain percentage (about 33 per cent) of all treaty-limited armaments. This aims at ensuring that no one country will have an overriding superiority in armaments, yet takes account of the fact that some countries are larger than others. A final noteworthy aspect of the CFE Treaty is that it limits the deployment of residual force levels in each of these five armament categories to specific zones. Thus, the Treaty's area of application, which stretches from the Atlantic to the Ural mountains, is divided into a set of concentric circles, within which specific force limits are set. Specific force limitations have also been agreed to for the flank areas to take account of the geographical peculiarities pertaining to these regions and to avoid a concentration of forces in these areas.

234. The net effect of these limitations is to eliminate any one country's ability to conduct a surprise attack within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region. Equal ceilings between the two Groups of States ensure a balance of forces at lower levels; the sufficiency rule deprives any one country of the ability to conduct offensive operations against a coalition of other countries; and the zonal force limitations reduce the concentration of forces at any particular point. In this manner, the CFE Treaty effectively curtails the ability to

generate a sufficient degree of strategic thrust necessary for large-scale offensive operations. At the same time, the Treaty allows each country to retain sufficient forces for an effective defence.

235. The second element of a concerted effort to limit conventional armaments in order to promote a greater defensive orientation could consist of limiting where appropriate the range of weapons systems capable of striking targets deep into the opponent's territory. The principal weapon systems of concern here are long-range combat and carrier-borne aircraft and, particularly, ballistic missiles. The deployment of a substantial bomber force capable of delivering large quantities of munitions over great distances provides a country with the ability to conduct devastating offensive operations. Such a capability would be particularly worrisome if it is combined with a large inventory of armoured capabilities necessary to seize and hold territory. This is why agreements on the limitation of long-range aircraft should be pursued in an effort to reduce the offensive capability of military forces.

236. Another problematic aspect in this regard is ballistic missiles, particularly those of longer range. Given their small payload (relative at least to large aircraft) and their ability to penetrate an adversary's territory in a short period of time, ballistic missiles are especially well suited for attack on high value targets deep in an opponent's territory. Even if inaccurate and armed solely with conventional warheads, the use of ballistic missiles can have a profound psychological and economic, if not military and political, impact, as indeed their use during the Iran-Iraq war and recent Persian Gulf war demonstrated. Finally, their dual-capability, as well as the fact that ballistic missiles are the weapons of choice to deliver chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, suggests that their continued deployment makes them inconsistent with the condition of "defensive security".

237. The specific threat posed by long-range missiles has been recognized in recent arms control developments, in particular in the nuclear field. For example, the 1987 INF Treaty bans United States and Soviet ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,000 kilometres. Under the United States initiative of September 1991, United States and Russian short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear-armed cruise missiles will also be withdrawn from forward locations and naval vessels. Outside the United States-Soviet context, the United Nations Security Council decided in resolution 687 (1991) to seek the elimination of all Iraqi ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres.

238. These examples show that there is scope for agreements limiting ballistic missiles in the nuclear as well as conventional fields. As a first step, States might begin by negotiating regional limitations on ballistic missiles. For instance, Security Council resolution 687 (1991) stresses that the ban on Iraqi ballistic missiles should be viewed as a first step to their elimination throughout the region. The United States initiative on Middle East arms control of May 1991 also proposes "a freeze on the acquisition, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles by States in the region with a view to the ultimate elimination of such missiles from their arsenals". 47/ Other

States might also wish to negotiate agreements banning ballistic missiles within their respective regions.

239. The final element of a conventional arms limitation agreement aimed at promoting a greater defensive orientation consists of limiting the readiness and sustainability of military formations in peace as well as during combat. A high peacetime readiness and the ability to sustain military operations at a distance for long periods of time are both crucial elements of an offensive military capability. Hence, limiting these readiness and sustainability factors will contribute to greater defensiveness.

240. Readiness levels can be reduced by limiting the peacetime manning levels of military formations. This would require limits on manpower that have some relation to the military equipment levels that each party to the agreement can deploy. Reserve training could also be limited in terms of frequency and duration to ensure that any mobilization will take time. Another way in which to reduce force readiness is to limit active-duty ground equipment and store the remainder. For example, under the CFE Treaty, only about 85 per cent of the allowable ground equipment holdings can be deployed with active units, with the rest placed in storage. Any withdrawal of the stored equipment is subject to 42-day advance notification and must be returned to the storage sites within six weeks.

241. The net effect of these limitations is to increase the dependency of active-duty formations on reserves to achieve combat strength. Since it will take time for reserve units to become combat ready, the ability to conduct military operations on short notice will be reduced. Any indication that reserves are being called up and trained would provide warning that something might be awry. With sufficient warning, States can take actions to bolster their defences and move on the diplomatic front to resolve a possible conflict. However, the exception to these measures noted in paragraph 127 above should be borne in mind.

242. In addition to low levels of readiness, limiting the sustainability of armed forces can also contribute to demonstrating defensiveness. The key here would be the mutual curtailment of the forward-deployed logistics base as well as the mobility of combat support operations. Deploying fuel and ammunition dumps in the rear is one way to convey defensive intentions. If the ability to bring supplies rapidly forward is limited as well, then the very capability for conducting military operations at a distance will have been curtailed. Agreements to this effect will therefore strengthen defensive over offensive capabilities.

243. Arms limitation agreements that cover these three areas of conventional forces could help to strengthen the basic defensive orientation of military capabilities. Although the agreements would not in and of themselves guarantee the absence of an ability to conduct offensive operations, they would make such operations both more difficult and less likely to succeed. As a result, the inclination to use military force offensively will have been reduced, and mutual confidence in the basic defensive nature of respective

intentions will have increased. Of course, mutual confidence requires an assurance that agreements, once negotiated, will be complied with. This is why adequate and effective verification of agreements plays a crucial part in the promotion of "defensive security".

D. Verification of compliance

244. States have long recognized that the effectiveness of arms limitation and disarmament agreements depends on the inclusion of an adequate and effective verification regime. Only if parties to an agreement are confident that the other parties will comply with its terms will the agreement have its intended effect. Verification of compliance therefore forms an essential element in the promotion of "defensive security".

245. In 1988, the United Nations Disarmament Commission agreed to a set of 16 principles of verification to be used as guidelines in the negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The principles, which were endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 43/81 B, are as follows:

> "(1) Adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
>
> "(2) Verification is not an aim in itself, but an essential element in the process of achieving arms limitation and disarmament agreements.
>
> "(3) Verification should promote the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure that agreements are being observed by all parties.
>
> "(4) Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international technical means and international procedures, including on-site inspections.
>
> "(5) Verification in the arms limitation and disarmament process will benefit from greater openness.
>
> "(6) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to interfere with the agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification, when these are operating in a manner consistent with the provisions of the agreement and generally recognized principles of international law.
>
> "(7) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should include explicit provisions whereby each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the agreement.
>
> "(8) To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the

verification system, an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, time-frames for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment.

"(9) Verification arrangements should be addressed at the outset and at every stage of negotiations on specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

"(10) All States have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification agreements to which they are parties.

"(11) Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties.

"(12) Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement can only be made within the context of that agreement.

"(13) Verification of compliance with the obligations imposed by an arms limitation and disarmament agreement is an activity conducted by the parties to an arms limitation and disarmament agreement or by an organization at the request and with the explicit consent of the parties, and is an expression of the sovereign right of States to enter into such arrangements.

"(14) Requests for inspections or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal component of the verification process. Such requests should be used only for the purpose of determining compliance, care being taken to avoid abuses.

"(15) Verification arrangements should be implemented without discrimination, and, in accomplishing their purpose, avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of State parties or other States, or jeopardizing their economic, technological and social development.

"(16) To be adequate and effective, a verification regime for an agreement must cover all relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities." 32/

246. Verification regimes have a variety of different functions. The report of the Secretary-General on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification listed five specific functions of verification: assessing implementation, generating confidence, dealing with uncertainties, discouraging non-compliance, and providing timely warning (see A/45/372 and Corr.1, paras. 24-42).

247. The primary function of verification is to assess the day-to-day implementation of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. States must have the ability through national, regional, international or cooperative means to assess the actions of all States parties in implementing the terms of the accord. The specific means for doing so will vary according to the nature of the agreement.

248. Another verification function is to build confidence among the parties that the terms of the agreement are being fully complied with, and this should be achieved without prejudice to the national interests of the parties involved. The two factors contributing to confidence-building are the provision of information regarding all matters that are the subject of the agreement and the ability of States to demonstrate that this information is complete and correct. For both these reasons, openness in the verification process is necessary, which explains why recent arms limitation and disarmament agreements have included provisions prohibiting concealment measures that may impede verification and permitted monitoring through national and international means. The resultant transparency concerning activities and matters relative to an agreement helps to build confidence that agreements are, and in the future will continue to be, adhered to.

249. Equally important is the function of providing procedures for dealing with uncertainties and false alarms associated with implementation and compliance. These procedures are necessary since no agreement can fully anticipate every possible future eventuality relating to its subject-matter. An open and cooperative verification regime can prevent the potentially adverse impact of such uncertainties and false alarms. Provisions for data exchanges, greater transparency through enhanced verification measures and a wide range of cooperative arrangements, including periodic review conferences, consultative procedures, and emergency meetings, are all useful for dealing with potential uncertainties.

250. Agreed verification provisions can create confidence in compliance by discouraging non-compliance. A well-designed verification regime will ensure early detection and produce clear evidence of non-compliant behaviour. By raising the financial, opportunity and political costs of non-compliant behaviour, adequate and effective verification provisions are likely to dissuade a party from engaging in such behaviour. It is important to stress however that a balance must be struck between the measures needed to discourage non-compliance and those necessary to carry out the provisions of an agreement without producing an excessive number of false alarms.

251. This latter function is very closely related to that of providing timely warning of potential compliance problems. In such cases, other States parties can consult, make representations to those contemplating prohibited activities and clarify the benefits of continuing to adhere to the agreement in question. A greater degree of intrusiveness will provide more timely access to facilities and areas of greatest concern. Properly devised challenge inspections can be particularly helpful in this regard.

252. The methods of verification can be grouped into two categories: national technical means (NTM) and cooperative measures. NTM are devices under the control of a State that can be used for monitoring at a distance compliance with agreements. They include observation satellites, aircraft-based systems such as radars and cameras, as well as sea- and ground-based systems. All States rely to a certain extent on NTM to verify compliance with agreements, although the technical means differ from State to State.

253. Cooperative measures have become increasingly useful as arms limitation and disarmament agreements have expanded in scope. They include designing weapons systems and their deployment modes in ways that simplify verification; permitting aircraft overflights to observe military-related installations and activities; pre-notifying certain weapons tests to allow others to monitor them more effectively; conducting joint verification experiments to assist monitoring efforts; arranging for foreign representatives to observe or inspect, with an appropriate degree of intrusiveness and timeliness, installations or activities; and non-interference with NTM. The exchange of information on those items affected by the agreement also forms a critical part of cooperative verification arrangements.

254. Many of the agreements concluded in recent years include most, if not all, of these cooperative measures. For example, under the START Treaty, heavy bombers carrying cruise missiles are designed in a way that differentiate them from those that do not, while mobile missiles are deployed in designated areas. Under the CFE Treaty, certain types of helicopters and aircraft can be recategorized or reclassified and some tanks and armoured combat vehicles may be converted, but this must be done in a way that renders them observably different from those systems that are limited. The Open Skies Treaty provides for the right to conduct overflights over the territory of the signatory States. Overflights are also included in the Vienna Document and form part of the Sinai Separation-of-Forces agreements. Joint verification experiments have been conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union in connection with strategic nuclear and chemical weapons arms limitation agreements. Finally, on-site inspections have in recent years become a notable element of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The IAEA safeguards agreements, the Vienna Document, and the INF, CFE and START Treaties all include provision for a number of routine and special inspections. A most noteworthy on-site inspection regime is the one that governs the Argentinian-Brazilian nuclear agreement, which provides for a common system for accountability and control of all nuclear installations and facilities.

255. In the past, it has at times proven difficult to persuade States to endorse an adequate and effective verification regime that fulfils these functions effectively. Particularly among States in which mistrust runs high, the intrusive and open nature required by a verification regime that is capable of accomplishing its functions has often been judged as posing too great a risk to their national security interests. In such a situation, there is an important role to be performed by a third party that is recognized by all parties to be genuinely impartial. Even if States might not trust their

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potential opponents in conducting intrusive inspections, for example, they might have sufficient confidence in an impartial third party to perform these tasks. Over time, as confidence is built among the parties to the agreement, the verification tasks could then be undertaken by the States parties themselves.

256. The experience of the Sinai agreements of the 1970s demonstrates the effectiveness of third party involvement in verification. In all these agreements, the role of the United Nations as well as of the United States proved to be crucial to forging agreement between Egypt and Israel in implementing the provisions of the accords. Both countries regarded the United Nations and the United States as sufficiently impartial to perform the verification tasks that were essential to the effective implementation of the agreements. Over time, as confidence was built between the two parties, the role of, first the United Nations, and later the United States, in verifying agreed provisions was reduced. In the end, verification was largely performed by Egypt and Israel themselves.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

257. This study has identified how defensive security concepts and policies could be a means to fulfilling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Its focus has been on practical measures in the political and military fields that are both consistent with and a means towards implementing the crucial notions of defensiveness and self-restraint that are enshrined in the provisions of the Charter calling on Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their international relations and recognizing their inherent right to individual and collective self-defence.

258. "Defensive security" is based on the recognition that its achievement depends upon creating the political and military conditions necessary for eliminating threats to international peace and security. Its goal is to promote awareness of the indivisibility of security by forgoing measures in the political and military fields that might appear threatening, offensive or provocative, establishing a concerted dialogue among States, strengthening collective security and other cooperative arrangements, adopting confidence- and security-building measures, pursuing a gradual restructuring of military force postures and reducing armaments. These and other steps would contribute to establishing a condition of "defensive security", as defined in paragraph 12 above.

259. It is recognized that the introduction of "defensive security" on a global basis in international relations will be a gradual process. The achievement of "defensive security" on a global basis requires a step-by-step approach that will differ from region to region and from one bilateral relation to another. In some regions, major progress has recently been achieved in transforming relations among States, and the possibility of achieving a system of cooperative security based on principles of "defensive security" is therefore clearly present. In many regions, however, basic

conflicts persist, although some rudimentary steps towards "defensive security" are being taken.

260. Bearing in mind the distinctiveness of the security situations facing States, there are certain steps that all States can take to implement "defensive security". Foremost amongst these is respect for the principles and provisions of collective security embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. The strengthening of cooperative arrangements, regional or otherwise, is also fully consistent with and an important contributor to a strategy for promoting "defensive security". Similarly, political and military confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing openness and transparency can reduce secrecy and suspicions and create the degree of mutual trust necessary to convince States to adopt more defensively oriented military postures. Constraints on certain military activities, limits on and reduction in specific military equipment holdings and the reduction and ultimate elimination of weapons of mass destruction, if verified effectively and adequately, also form vital components of a defensive restructuring of a State's armed forces.

261. In pursuing these steps, however, States should be aware that the implementation of defensive security concepts and policies faces a number of problems. The present study demonstrates the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of clearly distinguishing between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons and weapon systems. Like military formations, weapons and weapon systems can be used in an "offensive" as well as "defensive" mode. It is only within the context they are used that clear distinctions become apparent. This context, however, is by definition particular to specific circumstances. Similarly, it is recognized that the principle of collective defence requires that some States possess military capabilities that may exceed those necessary for the defence of their own national territory. In those situations, the possession and eventual use of such capabilities should be for the sole purpose of implementing collective self-defence in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

262. The Group of Experts is aware that, since the specific security situation States face within their own region are likely to differ, there are no universally applicable, ready-made schemes for implementing defensive security concepts. Thus in order to identify possible measures for promoting "defensive security" within their own regions, States should feel encouraged to initiate an assessment of the security situation in their own regions and identify possible steps and measures to implement defensive security concepts and policies. On the basis of these voluntary assessments, States within a region could commence a dialogue aimed at defining the regional security situation, identifying possible measures for promoting defensiveness and self-restraint and finding a basis for implementing "defensive security" in the future. This dialogue might be conducted either at a bilateral or multilateral level, including through various regional and subregional organizations and other such cooperative arrangements.

263. The United Nations, through the Office for Disarmament Affairs, could

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promote regional/subregional dialogues along these lines by convening expert meetings, seminars and conferences designed to discuss regional/subregional security questions in an informal setting. Such meetings could be modelled after the seminars/conferences that the Office has organized in the past, particularly within the framework of the Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament established by the General Assembly in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia and the Pacific.

A. Collective security and cooperative arrangements

264. The strengthening of regional and other cooperative efforts in recent years is a positive development. Political and economic cooperation within and between regions is a valuable basis for building mutual trust and confidence between States. Enhanced confidence and greater trust in inter-State relations will lay a secure and stable foundation for implementing "defensive security" over time.

265. The prevention of conflict, the management of crises and the resolution of disputes should whenever possible be undertaken at the regional level. The States concerned are most directly affected by the circumstances and best able to assess for themselves the necessary steps to build peace and strengthen security among them. Success in these endeavours may further strengthen regional cooperation and enhance confidence and mutual trust. Regional dialogues on security in general and military matters in particular would be of great importance. All States should be encouraged to engage in such regional dialogues in the future.

266. The strengthening of the United Nations in recent years and its positive role in solving a number of conflicts throughout the world is a welcome development. The maintenance and expansion of this role, however, is to a large extent dependent upon a non-discriminatory treatment of all conflict situations by the United Nations. The enhanced role of the United Nations in peacemaking and the increasing number of peace-keeping missions undertaken by the United Nations since the late 1980s attest to a commitment by States to resolve their disputes peacefully. At the same time, the financial, human and technical resources required for fulfilling the rapidly growing demands placed on the United Nations should be forthcoming and the Organization's capability to deal with these demands enlarged. In this regard, the Secretary-General's recent report entitled "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping" (A/47/277-S/24111) contains a number of suggestions the Group of Experts found particularly relevant to "defensive security", especially those relating to preventive diplomacy.

267. The ability to conduct military operations collectively and in a manner fully consistent with the principles of collective security as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations can provide valuable incentives for all States to adopt defensive military postures and remove incentives for acquiring offensive, threatening and potentially provocative military capabilities. In so doing, prospects for the peaceful settlement of disputes will be enhanced,

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thereby contributing to reducing the role of military force in international relations.

268. To ensure that the force projection capabilities necessary for collective military action are not perceived as threatening or provocative by other States, the idea of role specialization is worthy of further study.

B. Openness, transparency and confidence-building

269. The concept of "defensive security" rests on an awareness on the part of States that their security is indivisible. Such awareness can be promoted through political and military measures. Common to both sets of measures is the notion of openness and transparency in political and military affairs. Excessive secrecy breeds distrust and thus promotes a sense of insecurity; on the other hand, openness in political and military affairs is likely to build confidence in relations between States.

270. The present study has identified practical political and military steps that can promote openness and build confidence over time. States have little incentive to greater openness without reciprocity. Therefore, bilateral and regional negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures - including information, communication, access, notification and constraint measures - are a valuable way in which to promote the implementation of "defensive security". At the same time, it may be more difficult to take steps towards greater openness in regions of conflict.

271. Recent experience from such negotiations in a variety of regions may have practical implications for future efforts in this area. These include the following:

(a) While there are a host of conceivable confidence- and security-building measures, negotiating agreements on specific measures will take time. The prevention of conflict and the building of confidence between States is a gradual process that requires a just treatment of the case and time to achieve its intended effect;

(b) The building of confidence between States in the military field requires openness and transparency. Although some aspects of military activities involve inevitably an element of confidentiality and secrecy, this element should be strictly limited in order to dispel misperceptions and misunderstandings leading to mistrust and worst-case assumptions;

(c) States are more willing to reduce their military capabilities once they gain confidence regarding the defensive orientation of opposing military force postures;

(d) An effective confidence-building process may, in certain situations, benefit from third-party participation. The involvement of third parties that are regarded as impartial by all sides in a conflict is often necessary to get negotiations going. A third party may be a country, a group of countries, a regional organization or the United Nations.

C. Restructuring military forces

272. Once a sufficient degree of mutual trust has been established or a modicum of common interests has been identified, States may decide that their security is best served by placing mutual restrictions on their forces. In this manner, the traditional goals of arms control - to reduce the cost of maintaining military forces, the probability of war and the extent of damage in case of war - can be achieved. In addition, arms limitation and disarmament agreements can serve the more specific purpose of promoting "defensive security". Depending on the details, the defensive nature of military force postures can be enhanced by agreements that limit or reduce particular aspects of these postures.

273. In the area of weapons of mass destruction, major progress has been made in recent years. It can be expected that the 1972 Convention banning biological weapons will be followed later this year by a convention banning all chemical weapons. In the nuclear area, the East-West arms race has already ended and has been reversed. However, serious problems still exist, including the continued presence of large numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of some States and the continuance of nuclear weapons tests by some States, as well as problems relating to the proliferation of such weapons, both vertically and horizontally. Consequently nuclear disarmament should continue to be pursued with increasing resolve. Within the framework of general and complete disarmament, an objective which shall need a long transitional period, the nuclear weapon States should undertake further substantial reduction of their nuclear weapons stockpiles as a step towards their total elimination.

274. Arms limitation and disarmament agreements designed to enhance the defensive nature of conventional military capabilities should focus on three elements. First, the ability to generate strategic thrust through a combination of high mobility and concentrated firepower should be reduced in a balanced fashion. Secondly, forces capable of destroying targets deep in an opponent's territory should be adequately curtailed. Finally, the readiness and sustainability of conventional military formations should be limited commensurate with defensive requirements. In so doing, the ability to conduct large-scale strategic offensive operations or launch a surprise attack will be eliminated. In each of these cases, it is important to ensure that capabilities are reduced on a reciprocal, equitable and balanced basis within a given region or subregion.

275. Arms limitation agreements that cover these areas could help to strengthen the basic defensive orientation of military capabilities. Although the agreements would not in and of themselves guarantee the absence of an ability to conduct offensive operations, they would make such operations both more difficult and less likely to succeed. As a result, the inclination to

use military force offensively will have been reduced and mutual confidence in the basic defensive nature of respective intentions will have increased. Of course, mutual confidence requires the assurance that agreements, once concluded, will be complied with. This is why adequate and effective verification of agreements plays a crucial part in the promotion of "defensive security".

276. As the present study makes clear, there have been only a few instances of successful bilateral or multilateral negotiations designed to effect a fundamental restructuring of military forces towards a defensive orientation. The modalities of achieving such a restructuring are complex and difficult to negotiate. To enhance the prospect for success in the future, States could start a dialogue on how a restructuring of their military forces towards a defensive orientation could be achieved through negotiations. The United Nations, through the Office for Disarmament Affairs, should contribute to this dialogue by convening periodic meetings, seminars and conferences of governmental and non-governmental experts designed to investigate this issue in greater detail.

D. Towards "defensive security"

277. A study of the state of security in the world reveals some situations in which "defensive security" is closer to reality, others in which the prospects for "defensive security" seem promising and, finally, others in which relations are marked by tension and disputes and where a concept of security based on military strength prevails. Although the modalities of implementing "defensive security" could vary, strict adherence to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and a respect for international law provide a necessary basis. Wherever possible, increased openness and transparency in political and military affairs is also necessary. Other measures and steps have been identified in the present study as well. Above all, however, States should commit themselves to regional and other forms of dialogue designed to identify possible steps they could take individually or in concert to move towards "defensive security". In this manner, all States may over time arrive, albeit by different routes, at a situation in which "defensive security" may prevail.

278. The General Assembly, in its resolution 45/58 O, invited "Member States to initiate or intensify the dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies at the bilateral level, particularly at the regional level and, where appropriate, at the multilateral level". To this end, Member States could:

(a) Express their views on the concept and objective of "defensive security", as defined in the present study;

(b) Examine their current situation with respect to the political and military aspects of "defensive security";

(c) Determine to what extent their international relations, their security commitments and their regional situation might enable them to consider taking measures, on the basis of reciprocity, to achieve a situation of "defensive security" at the bilateral, regional or multilateral level. The States that share common security interests at a regional or other level might consider undertaking consultations among themselves;

(d) Consider, individually or jointly, problems relating to the resources needed to fulfil collective security commitments consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;

(e) Keep the Secretary-General informed of progress or initiatives in the field of "defensive security".

279. In view of the above, the General Assembly may wish to keep itself informed of the state of "defensive security" and the progress achieved in this regard.

Notes

1/ See, for example, the report by the Secretary-General on the work of the organization, Official Records of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 1 (A/46/1), pp. 11-16.

2/ "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" (Brussels: NATO Press Services, 8 November 1991), p. 2.

3/ "Documents of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe", Stockholm, 19 September 1986.

4/ "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe", Paris, 19 November 1990 CD/1064.

5/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles", Washington, 7 December 1987 (CD/798 and CD/800).

6/ Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Moscow, July 1991.

7/ For details on ONUVEN, see A/44/642 and Corr.1, A/44/834, A/44/917, A/44/921 and A/44/927.

8/ See S/22031.

9/ See S/23402 and Add.1.

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Notes (continued)

10/ See "Report of the Secretary-General on Conflicts in Africa: Proposals for a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution", Council of Ministers, Organization of African Unity (OAU), Fifty-sixth Ordinary Session, 22-27 June 1992, Dakar, Senegal, CM/1710 (LVI).

11/ See "Plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991): report of the Secretary-General (S/22871 and Rev.1); and Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the Security Council the plan prepared by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) (S/22872 and Rev.1 and Rev.1/Corr.1).

12/ See report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 721 (1991) (S/23280, annex III) and his further reports to the Security Council on the subject (S/23363 and Add.1; S/23513; S/23592; S/23836 and S/23844).

13/ See, among others, Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Defence in the Nuclear Age, Adelphi Paper No. 224 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 3; Marion W. Boggs, Attempts to Define and Limit "Aggressive" Armaments in Diplomacy and Strategy, University of Missouri Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 1941); and George Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1977).

14/ League of Nations, Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Series B, Minutes of the General Commission (Geneva, 1932-1936), pp. 113 and 116.

15/ See Albrecht von Müller and Andrzej Karkoszka, "An East-West Negotiating Proposal", in Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defence (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 138.

16/ "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)", Voyennaya Mysl 30 November 1990.

17/ "On the Military Doctrine of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty", statement issued by the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, Berlin, 28-29 May 1987.

18/ "The Military Doctrine of Russia (Draft)", Military Thought, May 1992, p. 10.

19/ Marlies ter Borg and Wim Smit, Non-Provocative Defence as a Principle in Arms Reduction (Amsterdam, Vrije Universiteit, 1989), p. 1.

20/ Alvin M. Saperstein, "Primer on Non-Provocative Defense" Arms Control, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1988, p. 65.

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21/ Egbert Boeker and Lutz Unterseher, "Emphasizing Defence", in Frank Barnaby and Marlies ter Borg, eds., Emerging Technologies and Military Doctrine: A Political Assessment (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 89.

22/ See, among others, Stephen J. Flanagan, "Non-Provocative and Civilian-Based Defenses", in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison and Albert Carnesale, eds., Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophes (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1988), p. 98; "Non-Offensive Defense", special issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1988; Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Foundations of Defensive Defense (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990); and Jonathan Dean, "Alternative Defence: Answer to NATO's Central Front Problems", International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1987-88.

23/ See, for example, Klaus Naumann, "Doctrine and Force Structures", in Ian Cuthbertson and Peter Volten, eds., The Guns Fall Silent: The End of the Cold War and the Future of Conventional Disarmament (New York Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990).

24/ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 357.

25/ Freedman, Strategic Defence in the Nuclear Age, op. cit., p. 43.

26/ See the Report to the General Commission of the Special Committee on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, in League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Conference Documents, volume I (Geneva, December 1932).

27/ S/C.3/30, 13 August 1948.

28/ John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 26.

29/ See Tomohisa Sakanaka, "International Relations in Asia", in United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Nonoffensive Defense: A Global Perspective (New York, Taylor and Francis, 1990), especially pp. 121-23.

30/ S/23500.

31/ See J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Nonprovocative Defence Strategy", in UNIDIR, Nonoffensive Defence: A Global Perspective (London, Taylor & Francis, 1990), pp. 113-17.

32/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth special session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 60 (para. 6 of the quoted text).

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35/ Darilek, "Have Arms Control, Will Travel", op. cit., p. 20.

36/ "Report of Working Group I on agenda item 4", Disarmament Commission substantive session 1992 (A/CN.10/1992/CRP.3), 8 May 1992.

37/ "Plan for Arms Control and Disarmament" (Embassy of France, Washington, D.C., 3 Jun 1991).

38/ "Communique from the Paris Meeting of the Five on Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation", Paris, 8-9 July 1991.

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40/ Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 1251; and Lederman, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

41/ Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.II/13/II, September 1986, pp. 3, 5 and 6.

42/ Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.III/23/II, September 1991, pp. 13-18.

43/ Resolution 46/30 of 6 December 1991 is the most recent resolution adopted by the General Assembly on this subject.

44/ "Address by H.E. Moshe Arens, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel", Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested Parties, Plenary Session, 9 January 1991.

45/ Conference on Disarmament, CD/989, 20 April 1990.

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Notes (continued)

46/ The 29 signatory States are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

47/ "Fact Sheet on Middle East Arms Control Initiative" (Washington, D.C.: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 29 May 1991), p. 2.
